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 January 21st 2014. This date marks the beginning of the 2016 New Hampshire primary 
exhibition season. Three years from this date, the newly elected President of the United States 
will take the oath of office in Washington D.C. For now, things are quiet. Mitt Romney had lost 
the most recent presidential race to Barack Obama just over a year ago. Governor Chris Christie 
and Secretary Hillary Clinton are both leading early polls for the 2016 presidential election. The 
Democrats hold the White House and the Senate. The New Hampshire primary is an afterthought 
on this winter morning in 2014. Between this date and the 2016 New Hampshire primary, history 
will be made. It will all begin in a tiny state no one usually talks about, at a college no one 
usually talks about.  
 Saint Anselm College, a small, liberal arts college located on the outskirts of Manchester, 
New Hampshire, is about to witness history. It is dark and cold, such as the majority of winter 
mornings in the Granite State. Most students are asleep, and the ones that are up, should be 
inching to the dining hall to grab some breakfast. But today is different. Today the dining hall is 
sealed off from students and reserved for the New Hampshire politicos and business leaders. 
Today the New England Council, a pro-business lobbying group, which has grown in visibility, 
in large part due to their famed Politics and Eggs breakfast events, is about to host a different 
type of speaker.  
 The layout for Politics and Eggs is simple. The audience, those who work in banking, 
finance, real estate, communications, and politics, have breakfast while listening to a politician 
give a speech on the topic of the day. For the most part, speakers adjust their message to the 
business community; speaking on taxes, regulations, shifts in industries they have seen, and so 




candidate for President. The only difference going forward would be, ironically, the size of the 
audience. Most breakfasts will fill a small auditorium at the New Hampshire Institute of Politics, 
no more than one hundred people. But this breakfast will fill an entire dining hall. Because on 
this day, the New England Council is not hosting the average rising political star, they are 
hosting Donald Trump.  
 He is larger than life in his physical appearance as well as his lifestyle and actions. His 
stern, gritty face occasionally cracks a smile as he walks over to the front of the hall to shake 
hands. Mr. Trump, as he preferred to be called at the time, walks into Davison Hall, the crowd of 
attendees quickly gravitate towards the man who would eventually win this primary state over, 
and sling shot his candidacy to the presidency.  Long-time bodyguard Keith Schiller, and long-
time attorney Michael Cohen follow Mr. Trump behind him. He takes the stage, and from there, 
the primary begins.  
 After thanking Mayor Ted Gastas, and congratulating The Union Leader publisher Joe 
McQuaid (McQuaid would not be a friend of Trump’s during the primary), Mr. Trump begins 
his speech praising New Hampshire, going from anecdote after anecdote at a moment’s notice. 
He explains why he became involved in politics in the first place; to obtain zoning permits for 
his buildings. He argues that Romney did not win in 2012 because he was not himself on the 
campaign trail. Trump thought the most recent presidential election at the time lacked a bit of 
authenticity; a theme that will absolutely be a theme during the 2016 presidential election. 
Trump concluded his remarks, now it is time for questions.  
 Every Politics and Eggs ended with a Q&A session with the audience, a sort of elite town 
hall meeting so to speak. These sessions would normally give candidates a chance to explain 




event. But in addition, one of the last questions foreshadowed the outcome of the New 
Hampshire primary. After a quick silence from the audience, Jim Brett, President and CEO of the 
New England Council, asks Mr. Trump, “We are two years out; who are some of the candidates 
you’d like to see other than yourself (Trump laughs) running in 2016?” After a pause from 
Trump, (and a number of somewhat unrelated anecdotes) he responds, “I have a feeling that it is 
going to be somebody who nobody has even been thinking about.” He continues, “Hey, nobody 
had ever heard of Barack Obama, right?”  
 Over the course of two hours, Donald Trump kicked off the race for the presidency in 
New Hampshire. Over the course of the next two years, it would become “anyone’s race.” There 
will be town halls, meet & greets, house parties and policy speeches. Campaigns will grow, 
shrink, become frustrated, and elated. The media will swarm the tiny New England state. 
Friendships will be made and broken. Dreams will be crushed. This will all happen under the 
notion that in New Hampshire is the only state in the union where a dark horse candidate, a 
candidate with little money and even less name recognition, can rise to the top of the political 
class. The reality is a different story.  
How the winners of the primary will end up is, for a number of reasons, beyond the reach 
of the voters in New Hampshire. The New Hampshire primary is a modern microcosm of the 
larger debate on campaign effects, an agenda-setting media, feuding parties, and campaign 
finance inequalities. This debate is played out in real time, starting with Donald Trump’s speech 
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The New Hampshire primary is a quadrennial political event like no other. We know that 
candidates place their hopes in the state, as they have for numerous election cycles, but we do 
not know the specifics on candidate appearances. Scholars have produced research pertaining to 
the effectiveness of campaign visits by candidates in other races, but the extent that we can apply 
this research to New Hampshire has yet to be established. In this paper, the conventional wisdom 
is examined. The conventional wisdom states that candidates must spend time and resources in 
New Hampshire in order to be successful in the New Hampshire primary. In the end, there is no 
relationship between the number of personal visits to New Hampshire and the voting results of 
the New Hampshire primary in most cases. Furthermore, the trends from these personal 
appearances shed light on partisan divisions and campaign finance differences. While this study 
examines a small subset of the overall presidential nomination race, it is a vital first step in 
learning more about the specific ground games that transpire during the course of the presidential 






Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
 This topic deserves attention because the New Hampshire primary has grown in 
influence. Today, the New Hampshire primary is considered the most important contest in 
predicting success in the nomination process (Mayer 2003). Before turning to the literature 
pertaining to campaign personal appearances, it is vital to establish how and why New 
Hampshire has grown in significance. Despite having significant influence in earlier 
nominations, the New Hampshire primary became more important to the presidential nomination 
process after the Democratic reforms following the 1968 nomination controversy.  
 The Democratic Party nominee in 1968, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, was defeated 
during a time of both domestic and international turmoil. This turmoil was reflected in the 
Democratic nomination contest when anti-war candidate Eugene McCarthy, a little-known 
senator from Minnesota, forced President Lyndon Johnson to withdraw from his reelection 
campaign. Humphrey did not enter a single primary in 1968, but still won the nomination, 
receiving 80 percent of the delegates on the first ballot at the Chicago convention (Kamarck 
2016). McCarthy, an anti-war candidate, was not rewarded for winning primaries and his 
supporters did not intend to sit back quietly after the convention ended. Anti-war Democrats 
wanted change.  
Democratic anti-war activists were angry over the Democratic nomination system. 
“McCarthy supporters in particular were enraged by arcane regulations and winner-take-all 
formulas in state primaries and caucuses which frequently left the senator sizable popular vote 
tallies but few delegates pledged to him” (Palmer 1997, p.71). The elite members of the 
Democratic party were forced to address the concerns.  
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In 1969, Fred Harris, then Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, put together 
two groups of twenty-eight people to discuss possible reform measures for the party. One group 
was to address “Party Structure and Delegate Selection,” and the other, “Rules” (Center 1972).  
These two commissions changed rules for the Democratic nomination process.  
The commissions came to be known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission, after the 
chairmen, South Dakota senator George McGovern and Minnesota congressman Donald Fraser, 
bound Democrats to eighteen new rules for future nomination races. These rules included a 
mandate to increase demographic representativeness, strict rules regarding caucus meetings and 
other state party activities, banning the selection of delegates before January 1 of an election 
year, and allowing no more than ten percent of delegates to be appointed by a party committee 
(Norrander 2015).  
 The Democratic Party needed to bring more voices into the nomination process. To this 
end, proponents of the reforms felt that “[P]arty membership, and hence opportunity to 
participate in the delegate selection process, must be open to all persons who wish to be 
Democrats and who are not already members of another political party” (Norrander 2015, p.336). 
Party officials sought a fairer system for voters.  
 Before the McGovern-Fraser reforms, elites ran the presidential nomination system. Ivan 
Hinderaker paints a vivid picture of a sly, corrupt system of nominee selection. “The real 
business of a national convention is done down under the stage, in dark and smelly rooms, or in 
hotel suites miles away. Presently a state boss fights his way out to his delegation on the floor 
and tells his slaves what is to be voted on, and how they are to vote,” (Hinderaker 1956, p.158).  
In other words, the delegates were placeholders with no power of their own. All of the tough, 
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vital decisions, were made by party elites. This was the way parties acted for most of American 
history (Cohen et al. 2009).  
The McGovern-Fraser Commission bound state Democratic parties to 18 rules for the 
succeeding nomination races. These rules included a mandate to increase demographic 
representativeness, strict rules regarding caucus meetings and other state party activities, banning 
the selection of delegates before January 1 of the election year, and allowing no more than ten 
percent of delegates to be appointed by a party committee (Norrander 2015).   
The Democratic Party also attempted to maintain control of the process by shifting the 
way delegates were selected “mandating the time (or ‘window’) during which delegates could 
legitimately be selected… requiring closer and closer approximations to purely proportional 
transformation of popular support into delegate support,” (Aldrich 2011, p.270). The Democratic 
Party reforms made the presidential nomination system a public system.   
 The effects of the Democratic nomination reforms elevated the New Hampshire primary 
to where it is on the national stage today, becoming what many believe is a decisive, vital contest 
in the winnowing process for presidential candidates. The Democratic reform movements 
incentivized states to move from caucus elections to primary elections for nomination races. This 
has led to the development of candidates using the sequence of states as a strategy, the front-
loading of primaries early on in the nomination calendar, and the emergence of the “invisible 
primary” (Scala 2003). This has allowed New Hampshire to gain influence in the presidential 
nomination system.   
One effect from the party reform movements is the campaign strategy of winning critical 
early primaries and caucuses. One aspect of the reform efforts was to establish a window rule, 
wherein states were coerced to hold their contest within a particular window of time. This effort 
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had the intention of leveling the playing field for all states. It was also put in place to avoid long, 
drawn out contests that could potentially divide the party. After the window rule was established, 
representatives from Iowa and New Hampshire lined up to defend their prized early status in the 
nomination races. “The (window) rule effectively ‘grandfathered’ Iowa and New Hampshire and 
created the privileged place in the presidential nomination system that they have held ever since” 
(Kamarck 2016, p.59). Iowa and New Hampshire’s early status grants them power and influence 
over the post-reform nomination race.  
The first politician to successfully use the new nomination system and to use the early 
primary and caucus victories to his advantage was President Jimmy Carter; a man who despite 
little name recognition and little cash-on-hand, was able to propel himself above the competition. 
President Carter had humble roots as a presidential candidate. By the time Carter ran for 
president in 1976, Carter had only amassed one term as Governor of Georgia. He was not 
connected to money or party influence. If the 1976 primary had taken place before the 
Democratic party reforms, President Carter’s campaign may have ended early. Carter won the 
nomination because he took advantage of the new party rules.  
Both Carter and his staffers knew that the new Democratic nomination rules meant early 
victories in the nomination cycle were critical for candidates. The new rules left room for 
momentum to play a role in the nomination race (Kamarck 2016). New Hampshire was 
particularly enticing to candidates such as Carter, because during the 1976 presidential election 
cycle, a relatively unknown candidate could run a successful campaign with only a quarter of a 
million dollars and 20-40 days in the state. Carter was said to have shook over six-hundred 
thousand hands during his 1970 gubernatorial campaign (Brereton 1987). Therefore, an 
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entrenched retail campaign in New Hampshire was the strategy the Carter campaign employed. 
States took notice of the time Carter spent in New Hampshire.  
Early state presidential contests, such as Iowa and New Hampshire, now had the power to 
provide momentum to presidential candidates. The further back a state’s primary or caucus 
election was held usually corresponded to a decrease in influence, as candidates left the race 
(Mayer 2003). Thus, frontloading began to take hold of the nomination process. Frontloading is 
when “more and more states schedule their primaries and caucuses near the beginning of the 
delegate selection season” (Mayer and Busch 2004, p.4).  
By March 15th, 1976, only 15% of primaries were held. This figure rose to 60% of 
primaries held by March 15th by the 2000 cycle (Adkins et. al. 2004). This is a complete turn 
from past precedent. The impacts of front-loading are to shorten the nomination season, put 
pressure on smaller candidates, and make early states influential in the presidential nomination 
calendar. By moving states up in the calendar year, the nomination process changed. Front-
loading places a burden on candidates “to both raise money and construct the necessary 
organization to build and maintain momentum needed later on in the process” (Adkins and 
Dowdle 2000, p.254). As a result of the reforms, early state primaries and caucuses became more 
important for generating momentum for winning candidates and stopping momentum for losing 
candidates. “As a result, since the late 1980s presidential nomination contests have come to a 
close by late April or earlier” (Norrander 2000, p.1010). Indeed, there are many benefits to not 
only having a primary, but also having a primary that is held earlier on the nomination calendar.  
A winnowing process occurs in the nomination process. When candidates begin losing 
early primaries and caucuses, they leave the nomination race (Norrander 2006). Holding a 
primary early on during the nomination process is better for a state. A state does not want to be 
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back-loaded and have just a few, if any, remaining candidates vie for the remaining delegates 
before the convention. States want to be first, when every candidate is still in the race. There are 
several benefits for states holding their primary or caucus early on the nomination calendar. In 
the post reform nomination environment, candidates spend literally years campaigning in early 
states, prior to voting.  
Before the reforms, very little campaigning occurred prior to the conventions (Adkins 
and Dowdle 2005). There was no need to campaign because party elites decided the party 
nominees. With the emergence of state primaries, the decisions were made by voters. “Most 
states subsequently adopted primaries, which developed the locus of decision for selecting 
convention delegates from the concentrated choices of party officials to the diffused choices of 
party activists and identifiers” (Steger 2000, p.729). This quote by Steger captures the essence of 
this shift to primaries. In 1968, there were 15 states that conducted primaries. By 2012, the 
number rose to 38. The reforms incentivized states to shift their nomination elections from 
caucuses to primaries. Because of this incentive, the frequency of primaries more than doubled 
(Kamarck 2016). States shifting from caucuses to primaries effected both parties, not just 
Democrats. The Republican Party did not have formal reform movements, but the shift to pre-
convention campaigning effected both parties, as it became easier for Republicans to shift their 
early contests to align with the Democrats.   
While some earlier nomination campaigns have relied on winning primaries before the 
reforms, Kennedy’s winning the Wisconsin and West Virginia primaries in 1960, for example, 
given that Democratic party elites were controlling the nomination process, building pre-
convention support by engaging in retail politics seemed rather foolish. The reforms produced 
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what we now call the “invisible primary,” that is, the period of time prior to the primary voting 
period when candidates seek the support of party elites and voters alike (Cohen et al. 2009). 
This development is the tangible shift from nominations being decided in private, smoke-
filled rooms. After the reforms, candidates spoke with voters in public town halls, coffee shops, 
and bars across the country. This naturally created a candidate-centered environment, that is, a 
political environment where the focus for voters is on individual candidate attributes, rather than 
party affiliation. A nomination race that is candidate-centered is more easily covered by the 
media and easier to interpret for the American voter (Kamarck 2016).  
 The emergence of the invisible primary corresponded with an increase in the number of 
candidates vying for the top spot in American politics. “More candidates now compete in more 
primaries for the votes of more party members than during the pre-reform era” (Steger 2000, 
p.727). As the post-reform era developed, more candidates attempted to gain pre-convention 
support. “Winning the presidential primary nomination is now most typically accomplished by 
establishing dominance in the pre-election phase and winning sufficient popular support in the 
initial contests to avoid being winnowed from the field” (Norrander 2006, p.506). Winning pre-
convention support contains many vital aspects; building a war chest of finances and staff, 
keeping the media focus on you, and winning critical primaries.  
The results that come out of Iowa and New Hampshire have reverberating effects that 
shape candidate success. This is why candidates spend so much time in states with early 
caucuses and primaries such as Iowa and New Hampshire (Christenson and Smidt 2012, p.618). 
Pulling off an early victory is critical to a presidential campaign. But of the two early contests, 
New Hampshire has more influence.  
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Winning the New Hampshire primary provides momentum for candidates. This same 
degree of momentum is not generated from winning the Iowa caucus. Even a second-place 
victory in New Hampshire has huge potential to lift a campaign, but the effect of Iowa is much 
smaller (Mayer 2003).  Voting patterns from New Hampshire explain nearly double the amount 
of variation among overall primary voting results (Hull 2008).  
New Hampshire, as a result of the Democratic Party reforms, has the potential to create 
momentum for the presidential nomination race. Some even argue that the placement from New 
Hampshire can correspond to the eventual candidate finishes for the nomination contest (Adkins 
and Dowdle 2001). Norrander argues that a contestant who wins the New Hampshire primary 
will have a candidacy that lasts 61 percent longer than a candidate who placed in the middle of 
the pack (Norrander 2006).  
It should be noted, that in recent cycles, particularly on the Democratic side, winners of 
the New Hampshire primary have not gone on to win the nomination. Hillary Clinton won the 
New Hampshire primary in 2008 but lost the nomination to the winner of the Iowa caucus that 
year, Barack Obama. Similarly, Bernie Sanders won the New Hampshire primary in 2016 but 
lost the nomination to the winner of the Iowa caucus that year, Hillary Clinton. Nevertheless, 
New Hampshire has traditionally held influence in the nomination race.  
It is not clear from historical examples whether one has to spend time in the state in order 
to win over voters. The literature does not establish whether or not a candidate must campaign 
often in New Hampshire in order to win the New Hampshire primary. From looking at the 
history of the New Hampshire primary, there is volatility in the results. Some candidates who 
win the New Hampshire primary have success in later contests and some candidates do not. The 
persuasiveness of retail campaigns in particular is the area of focus of this work.  
  9
The persuasive effects of in-person campaign contacts with voters are a point of debate 
among scholars. Kalla and Broockman conduct a meta-analysis of 49 different campaign field 
experiments to test the degree of effectiveness for campaign contacts. Kalla and Broockman test 
several forms of campaign contact including phone calls, mailings, as well as direct candidate 
contact. Kalla and Broockman test the minimal effects model for campaigning. The minimal 
effects model is the theory that campaigns do not have a persuasive effect on voters (Kalla and 
Broockman 2018). The minimal effects model for campaigning takes into account several 
aspects of the American electorate to argue that campaigns do not matter.  
Factors pertaining to minimal campaign effects include the stability of individual vote 
choices, the stability of partisanship in the electorate, the minimal effects conundrum in which 
those most open to influence by the campaign are least attentive to the campaign, and the 
predictability of election outcomes (Campbell 2008). The findings of Kalla and Broockman’s 
study reinforce the minimal effects model of campaigning.  
While the authors look at general elections rather than primary elections, the results are 
related to campaign activity during primary elections. In their analysis, Kalla and Broockman 
find that campaign contact can only shift election vote percentages by -.50 to 1.66 percentage 
points (Kalla, Broockman 2018). The results show that campaigning can account for over one 
and a half percent of variation for voting results. Investing resources in campaign contacts 
appears to be a foolhardy approach to winning elections. But, several authors argue candidate 
appearances can persuade voters.  
One study looks at the effectiveness of former Texas Governor Rick Perry’s personal 
appearance schedule during a reelection campaign. The authors of this work argue for several 
advantages for bringing out the candidate to make contact with voters. Perry’s campaign saw an 
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increase in local news coverage of his campaign when he visited an area of Texas. The campaign 
also saw positive news coverage of the events (Gimple and Shaw 2012). The campaign saw a 
sustained public opinion shift in favor of Governor Perry in the areas he visited as well as an 
increase in fundraising and volunteers in the areas he visited. However, the study also finds 
negative effects of in-person campaigning.   
Perry’s campaign additionally saw an increased mobilization effort by the Governor’s 
Democratic opponent (Gimple and Shaw 2012). This suggests that when a candidate travels, 
there is a zero-sum effect, wherein a candidate’s supporters and opponents are reminded of the 
political race and triggered to become mobilized in the process. Similar effects may be seen in 
studies pertaining to the New Hampshire primary.  
According to a study by Vavreck and her colleagues, candidate contact during the New 
Hampshire primary yields positive effects. After meeting a candidate in person, voters are able to 
positively rate the candidate they met. In fact, they are 75% more likely to be able to rate a 
candidate they met in person (Vavreck et al. 2002). Bringing out the candidate often may lead to 
more voters being able to positively rate the candidate. There is a positive priming effect when 
candidates make direct contact with voters (Arceneaux 2009). This gives weight to the notion 
that more time spent in an early primary state such as New Hampshire is advantageous to a 
presidential campaign.  
Hull explores if time in a state has positive effects for presidential campaigns. Although 
Hull studies the Iowa caucus, his study is directly related to New Hampshire visits. Hull finds 
that for every percentage point above the average number of days in Iowa, a presidential 
candidate will have a 0.061% positive impact on their vote share in Iowa (Hull 2007). From this 
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work, the evidence illustrations a positive outlook on a retail politics strategy of winning early 
primary states. But, there are obstacles for an on-the-ground campaign strategy.  
Retail politics needs voters who are involved in politics, but few voters are engaged 
civically. Indeed, “only a small minority of citizens are motivated to participate actively in 
political affairs, and indeed, only a bare majority of those eligible bother to vote in general 
elections, let alone vote in primaries or attend party caucuses” (Center 1974, p.343). But despite 
these low levels of voter participation for campaign events with candidates, there is a 
counterargument. 
 Because voters cannot or will not be involved in politics, presidential candidates must 
continuously attempt to persuade voters. The literature suggests presidential candidates do so in 
the most populated areas of a state. “Candidates generally campaign in more heavily populated 
areas because there are more voters there who can be mobilized by the visit, either by attending 
the rally or seeing coverage of it in the local news media” (Jones 1998, p.398). There is a 
necessity to campaign visits. Consistently spending time in the most populous areas of a state is 
the most efficient strategy of persuading the most voters. Presidential candidates also must attract 
media attention.  
The influence of the media is a widely accepted fact of American politics. The national 
media is now an institutionalized aspect of American life. There has also been a shift in media 
coverage, from substantive issues, to coverage of “the game” (Patterson 1980). “The game” asks 
the question, which candidates or parties are going to succeed in the upcoming presidential 
election and why. For primary campaigns, this type of coverage is often referred to as horse-race 
coverage. This clear-cut subject is favorable for media outlets and voters because the subject is 
much easier to understand compared to understanding substantive policy issues. It is no surprise 
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then, that the media covers horse-race coverage more than substantive issues (Farnsworth and 
Lichter 1999). For the New Hampshire primary, media coverage has persuasive effects.  
 New Hampshire newspaper coverage influences opinions on presidential candidates. In 
1996, when horse-race coverage represented 69% of the news for the frontrunner, readers of The 
Union Leader were found to have increased support for Pat Buchanan, consistently after the 
paper reported positive stories on the candidate (Farnsworth and Lichter 2002). John McCain 
also benefited from positive issue-framing during his numerous visits to the state prior to the 
2000 New Hampshire primary (Golan and Wanta 2001).  
Local New Hampshire newspaper coverage has influence to predict the winner of the 
New Hampshire primary. In 2004, horse-race coverage for Democratic presidential candidate 
John Kerry was found to be statistically significantly correlated to the amount of votes he 
received (Farnsworth and Lichter 2006). It is clear from the literature that Democratic and 
Republican candidates benefit from media attention. Having said that, Democratic and 
Republican electorates are different from one another.Traditionally, Democratic presidential 
campaigns are filled with indecisiveness and division, while Republican presidential campaigns 
are decisive (Adkins and Dowdle 2000). But the 2012 Republican primary was volatile.  
Republican presidential candidates in 2012 followed a pattern of discovery, scrutiny, and 
decline by Republican primary voters. Candidates who experienced this cycle were Rick Perry, 
Newt Gingrich, Herman Cain, and Michele Bachmann. The Republican electorate eventually 
came together to support Mitt Romney for the presidential nomination (Sides and Vavreck 
2013). Discovery, scrutiny, and decline refers to a cycle where candidates are discovered by the 
media and then scrutinized by the media. This would eventually cause the decline of the 
candidate, as public opinion caught hold of the scrutiny by the media. This cycle made for a 
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volatile environment for Republicans during the 2012 presidential nomination race (Sides and 
Vavreck 2013).  The volatility of the 2012 Republican primary indicates a break from the 
traditional path of the Republican electorate. Democratic nomination campaigns have shifted 
from the traditional path of the Democratic electorate.  
During the 2016 Democratic presidential election cycle, it was widely reported that 
Hillary Clinton’s campaign directed the Democratic National Committee to quietly support their 
efforts over that of Senator Sanders. Furthermore, in 2016, Clinton received virtually universal 
support among the Democratic elites (Brazile 2017). In recent election cycles, Democrats have 
been united in their support for their nominees, but that has not traditionally been the case.  
Democratic primaries traditionally tend to be indecisive, long, and sometimes hostile. 
Voters in the New Hampshire primary tend to be divided on which candidate to support when 
polled (Adkins and Dowdle 2005). Because of this trend, that Democratic primaries are decided 
later. Resources, such as cash reserves, become important only in the final quarters leading up to 
the election for Democrats (Adkins and Dowdle 2009). This is because party elites typically fail 
to coalesce around one candidate.  
Key Democratic endorsers are traditionally inclined to hold their support during the 
exhibition season. From 1976 to 2008, Democratic party elites failed to gather around one 
candidate in four of the six open nominations (Adkins and Dowdle 2009). Elite endorsements, 
even in the post-reform nomination environment, influence voter decisions. Endorsements are a 
powerful predictor for who will eventually take home the nomination. Because Democrats are so 
undecided during the period of the invisible primary, nomination races have traditionally been 
far more susceptible to variation (Steger 2007). Democratic party elites do not give the media 
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cues as to who they are supporting. Republican primary races, by contrast, are traditionally 
decisive. 
There are few movements for preference polling during the exhibition season for 
Republican presidential campaigns (Adkins and Dowdle 2005). The way campaign finance is 
used for Republicans lies in direct opposition to Democrats. Campaign finance is a resource best 
used in the early stages of the process for Republicans. After a candidate has established his 
dominance, well before the official start of the primary voting, the contest is already considered 
“decided” (Adkins and Dowdle 2005). This situation mirrors pre-reform nomination contests. In 
addition to differences among political parties, differences among campaign finance levels of 
presidential candidate’s leads to different campaign strategies.  
 Front-runners are different than long-shot candidates, both in their initial standings and in 
their campaign strategies. One way we see this difference is by looking at the reasoning behind 
each type of victory. Norrander argues that a victory for a front-runner can be traced back to their 
initial resources, while momentum is largely responsible for a long-shot victory. “Momentum 
candidates lag behind front runners in these early assets” (Norrander 2006, 488). Different levels 
of initial financing determine the goals of a campaign. Front-runners look to stay on top, and 
long-shot candidates look for momentum to move themselves to the top.  
 A candidate who is a front-runner, or an established candidate, is defined as a candidate 
who “has a substantial resource base, is well-known, and is considered credible by the media” 
(Gurian 1986, p.804). Front-runners have innate advantages when entering the exhibition season: 
high poll numbers, high levels of fundraising, and endorsements from elected officials. Font-
runners have national prominence, which candidates need to win presidential primaries 
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(Christenson and Smidt 2012). The task of a front-runner is to maintain their standing, rather 
than build momentum in early primaries and caucuses.  
 Long-shot candidates do not have any of the attributes that front-runners have. Long-shot 
candidates are “ignored by the media, which discourages their supports and diminishes fund 
raising, and denies them free public access” (Gurian 1986, p.804). They do not have resources or 
media access. Therefore, long-shot candidates need a different method to win the nomination. 
Because they are at such a disadvantage, long-shot candidates must rely on momentum to win 
the nomination. One way to gain momentum is through early primaries and caucuses. 
 Long-shot candidates favor early state primaries and caucuses. They have no other 
choice. They “cannot divide their resources across multiple contests, these candidates focus on 
early states in the hopes that an impressive showing will provide them with positive national 
media exposure” (Christenson and Smidt 2012, p.600). Long-shot candidates can get the most 
out of their investment in early primaries and caucus states. They need media coverage, (Haynes 
et al. 2004). And these early contests have proven to be, perhaps, the only option for such a case.  
The literature on electoral politics is quite extensive. The New Hampshire primary has 
grown in prominence as the Democratic reform movements allow for a candidate-centered 
environment. The degree to which campaigns matter, and how party and campaign finance 
factors play into the nomination race, is still a point of debate.  
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Chapter 2: Hypotheses, Data, and Methods 
Hypotheses 
 
H1: The more voters in a county, the more candidate appearances.  
 
H1o: There is no relationship between the number of voters in a county and the number of 
candidate appearances.  
 
H2: The more appearances a candidate makes in New Hampshire, the higher their votes will be.  
 
H2o: There is no relationship between the time a candidate spends in New Hampshire and vote 
share.  
 
H3: The more candidate appearances New Hampshire, the more New Hampshire newspaper 
name mentions they receive.  
 
H3o: There is no relationship between the number of candidate appearances and the number the 
number of New Hampshire newspaper mentions they receive. 
 
H4: The number and type of personal appearances for Democratic candidates will be different 
than the number and type of personal appearances for Republican candidates.  
 
H4o: There is no difference between the number and type of personal appearances between 
Democratic and Republican candidates.  
 
H5: The number and type of personal appearances by first-tier fundraising candidates will be 
different than second-tier fundraising candidates.  
 
H5o: There is no difference between the number and type of personal appearances by first-tier 




County Data: The number of voters in each county was compiled using the New Hampshire 
Secretary of State’s website. Specifically, the elections division of source contains statistics on 
the number of registered voters in each county during each presidential primary election year. 
Additionally, this source contains statistics on the number of registered independents who voted 
in the Republican or Democratic presidential primary in each election cycle. 
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Events Data: The events data used in this work comes primarily from Mr. Eric Appleman of 
Washington D.C. and his organization Democracy in Action. The primary sources Appleman 
used when compiling the events include, but are not limited to: the Des Moines Register, Drake 
University’s Iowa Caucus Project, WMUR’s Candidate Tracker, NECN Candidate Tracker, 
AFSC’s Governing Under the Influence, the Charleston Post & Courier, U.S. News Candidate 
Tracker, and the National Journal’s Candidate Tracker. Additionally, this author cross-referenced 
the data with candidate PAC schedules before candidates were officially declared and the 
websites of candidates after they declared. This author additionally cross-referenced state and 
county party websites and press releases, which contained detailed accounts of candidate 
schedules’. The author of this paper additionally cross-referenced candidate campaign emails for 
the 2016 cycle as the cycle was ongoing. (Descriptive statistics on events data can be found in 
Appendix A) 
 
Voting Data: Voting results for each New Hampshire presidential primary were collected using 
The New York Times’ reporting on each election. (Descriptive statistics on voting data can be 
found in Appendix A) 
 
Newspaper Data: Candidate name mentions were compiled using two New Hampshire 
newspapers, The Union Leader and The Concord Monitor. These two newspapers were used due 
to their prominence in New Hampshire as well as their easily accessible archive databases, which 
allowed for the collection of candidate name mentions. (Descriptive statistics on newspaper 
name mentions data can be found in Appendix B) 
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Party Data: The political party affiliation of each candidate can be accessed through the events 
and voting data.   
 
Finance Data: The data pertaining to campaign finance comes from the Federal Election 
Commission’s website, under presidential quarterly finance summaries.1 Additionally, data from 
outside spending groups comes from Open Secrets, a non-profit website, which tracks outside 
spending in American elections.2 (Descriptive statistics on campaign financing can be found in 
Appendix D) 
Hypotheses Conceptualization 
Candidates: The challenge of who to include in the analysis is vital to address. Appleman 
considers the candidates in his data set to be “top-tier” candidates. These candidates include, but 
are not limited to, candidates who actively hold or have actively held public office. Appleman 
incudes candidates who declared their intention to run for president, not potential presidential 
candidates. Deference was given to candidates who had not held public office, but had amassed 
campaign finance resources, such as Fiorina and Trump in 2016. See footnote 3 for more 
information on Appleman’s specific rational on candidate choices.  
 The question of whether to include dropout candidates, that is, candidates who entered 
the presidential race and exited before voting began in New Hampshire, is a valid question. This 
author included candidates who entered the presidential nomination cycle and dropped out before 
voting began i.e. Walker and Graham during the 2016 New Hampshire Republican primary. The 
activity of dropout candidates is vital to include to maintain robust findings. However, for clarity 
                                                 
1 https://classic.fec.gov/portal/presidential.shtml Under “Presidential Campaign Finance Summaries,” Accessed on 
April 26, 2018 
2 https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16 Under “Presidential Race,” Accessed on April 26, 2018 
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purposes, two analyses were conducted with and without dropout candidates to ensure that the 
proper findings were included.  
 
Events: Events include both media and campaign reported scheduled events. Additionally, this 
author included off the record (OTR) stops throughout the cycle. These are unannounced, and 
unscheduled stops such as a candidate getting coffee and subsequently listening to voters, a 
surprise encounter with a candidate in a restaurant or diner. These events will be publicized after 
the fact but are still vital to include given the effect they can have in the long run; these OTR 
stops are some of the most interesting encounters of the cycle. It is fair to say that certain events 
that are quite secret from the public are hard to pin down, but the methodology grants the reader 
a comprehensive look at both scheduled and unscheduled activity throughout each primary cycle. 
Prior to conducting the testing, a further conceptualization is needed. 3  
 Appleman collected data not only on the number of events each candidate held in New 
Hampshire, but also the number of visits to New Hampshire and the number of days spent in 
New Hampshire. While each metric is perfectly fine to examine the degree of effectiveness for 
campaigns, the number of events held by a candidate provides the most in-depth look at activity 
during the New Hampshire primary season. This is because there is a wide variety of events that 
candidates can hold in New Hampshire.  
Furthermore, there are no significant differences in conclusions depending on the variable 
used. For example, during the 2008 New Hampshire Republican primary, the correlation 
between the number of votes received by candidates and the number of events held by candidates 
is .864*. Similarly, the correlation between votes received by candidates and the number of days 
                                                 
3 For more information about Appleman’s specific rationale of which candidate or events to include, please see 
http://www.p2016.org/chrnprec/visitsrationale.html Under “Rationale, Methodology, and Limitations.  
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spent in New Hampshire is .842*. There is no difference in significance for these two metrics. 
Descriptive statistics for each variable can be found in Appendix A, but for the purposes of 
analysis, the number of personal appearances, or events, will be used as the metric for campaign 
activity during the New Hampshire primary season.  
 
Type of Events: The first area of interest for conceptualization is the type of events. There are a 
finite number of events candidates hold in New Hampshire. Candidate’s events can be one of 14 
possibilities of event types: private house parties, meet and greets, parades, rally/GOTV (Get-
out-the-vote), policy speeches, roundtables, facility tours, VIP meetings, meetings with editorial 
board, town halls, electioneering, watch parties, official party events, and finally campaign 
events for activists (Chart 2-1). A detailed categorization is below. 
 Several events where omitted from the data set. These include, but are not limited to, 
debates, media appearances, or primary paperwork filing in Concord. While these events do take 
place when candidates visit New Hampshire, they are omitted for several reasons. When debates 
are held in New Hampshire, nearly every candidate is a participant. Debates are not directly 
focused specifically on New Hampshire voters. Other events, such as media appearances and 
filling out paperwork do not involve interactions with voters or activists.  
These categories were further reduced to three broader categories based on the purpose of 
the event: activist, influence, or voter-based events (Chart 2-2). The intention of a candidate 
appearance for the New Hampshire primary has a number of facets to it. As discussed above, 
candidates are looking to get media attention, campaign activists, spread their message, and 
engage with voters, during their visits. It is important to note that some campaign appearances 
share all of these intentions. What separates one event type from the other is the audience.   
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A Republican town committee meeting is an example of an activist event. The audience 
are mainly political activists that the candidate is hoping to recruit as volunteers and even 
potentially staffers.   
 
Chart 2-1: New Hampshire primary Campaign Event Categories. 
Event Name Description 
House Party Any event at a private residence. 
Meet & Greet Informal event, where main emphasis is not on speech but on face to 
face interaction. 
Parade Presidential candidate participates in parade. 
Rally/GOTV  Speech, open to the public, designed to generate support for the 
campaign.  
Policy Speech Speech designed to show expertise in a policy area. 
Roundtable Small meeting or forum with specific issue sub-constituency, focusing 
on a narrow set of issues (more structured than a meet and greet, focus 
is issues).  
Facility Tour Candidate tours a workplace or other facility, mainly a photo-op even if 
some interaction. 
VIP Meeting Meeting with 1 or small group of people who are influential in the state. 
Meeting with 
Editorial Board 
Candidate meets with newspaper editorial board.  
Town Hall Events where candidate responds to audience questions, must be open to 
the public. 
Electioneering Candidate appears to campaign for or fundraise for another non-
presidential candidate, emphasis of event is on a particular candidate 
rather than the party generally (for instance, an RGA fundraiser for a 
candidate for governor would be coded as electioneering rather than a 
party-sponsored event). 








Any event sponsored by the campaign that is directly targeted at party 
activists. (i.e. Town Hall for a Republican town committee).  
 
A VIP meeting is an example of an influence event. Candidates are looking for some 
level of influence. This could be an endorsement from an individual or town paper. As is the case 
with a facility tour, it could mean access to a block of voters who work for a company or special 
interest.  
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A town hall meeting is an example of a voter event. The audience of a voter event is the 
voters. Candidates may adjust their message to be more diffusive; attempting to attract the 
largest number of voters to their message rather than playing to party strong points. 
 
Chart 2-2: New Hampshire primary Event Sub-Categories 
Category Description 
Activist Events held to enlist and retain volunteers to work on a campaign. House Party, 
Rally/GOTV, Official Party Event, Campaign Event for Activists, Watch Party, 
and Electioneering.  
Influence Event held to enlist support from people who hold significant influence over 
blocks of voters. Roundtable, Facility Tour, VIP Meeting, and E Board Meeting.  
Voter Events held to get support from voters. Meet and Greet, Town Hall, Parade, and 
Policy Speech. 
  
Unlike the finance categorization described above, this categorization is not drawn from a 
specific work of literature. The literature has yet to explore, to this level of detail, the impact of 
candidate events by presidential candidates. The categorization here is employed to reduce the 
number of event types to enhance analytical power. (Descriptive data on this subcategorization 
can be found in Appendix C)  
 
Newspaper Mentions: The newspaper name mentions for each candidate will be compiled 
beginning January 1 two years before the New Hampshire primary, i.e., January 1, 2014 through 
January 31, 2016, for the 2016 presidential election cycle. (Descriptive statistics of newspaper 
name mentions can be found in Appendix B) 
 
Party: Candidates who identify as Republicans will be categorized as such and candidates who 
identify as Democrats will be categorized as such.  
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Finance: The financial categorization of candidates is drawn from Norrander’s journal article 
“The Attrition Game”. “Candidates need to raise a specific amount of money to be viewed as 
competitive. In the most recent elections, this threshold amount has been pegged at $20 million, 
though the exact amount needed to be viewed as credible most likely depends on the highest 
amount raised in any year” (Norrander 2006, p.491). One setback to using this particular figure 
to break the finance tiers is that Norrander was writing in 2006. While the figure may be relevant 
in 2008, it may not apply to the 2016 election, ten years after Norrander wrote “The Attrition 
Game”. Furthermore, Norrander writing in 2006 did not anticipate the rise of outside campaign 
spending with the Citizens United v FEC Supreme Court decision. To address this potential 
setback, the breaking point for the two financial tiers will shift for the 2012 and 2016 elections. 
 The $20 million breaking point between first-tier and second-tier candidates is relevant 
for 2008. Therefore, $20 million raised, both for campaign fundraising and outside spending, 
will be the tier breaking point for the Republicans and Democrats in 2008. For the 2012 
Republicans, the average fundraising totals for first tier presidential candidates, those who raised 
or received in excess of $20 million dollars, decreased from the first-tier average of 2008, from 
$55,899,833 in 2008 to $43,604,447 in 2012. Given the approximately 20% decline, the tier 
break for the 2012 Republicans will be $16 million. Finally, in 2016 the average jumped to 
$67,848,621, or a 21% increase from 2008. The tier break for 2016 Republicans jumps to $24 
million in 2016.  
For the 2016 Democrats, the inequality between the top two candidates and the bottom 
three candidates does not warrant any change in the 2008 tier breaking level of $20 million. A 
detailed listing of every election cycle and candidate financing levels can be found in Appendix 
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D. This author acknowledges the limitations of such tiers but asserts that it is a prudent way to 
divide the candidates in half for an examination of inner-party dynamics.  
Methods 
The first hypothesis (H1) will be tested using a bivariate correlation coefficient to assess the 
relationship between the number of events held by candidates and the votes they receive. 
H1: The more voters in a county, the more appearances candidates will hold.  
 
The second hypothesis (H2) will be tested using a bivariate correlation coefficient to assess the 
relationship between the number of events held by candidates and the votes they receive.  
H2: The more appearances a candidate makes in New Hampshire, the higher their votes will be.  
 
 
The third hypothesis (H3) will assess, using a bivariate correlation coefficient, the number of 
events held by candidates on the number of newspaper name mentions for each candidate.  
H3: The more candidate appearances New Hampshire, the more New Hampshire newspaper 
name mentions they receive.  
 
 
The fourth hypothesis (H4) will be tested using a chi-squared (X2) test. The degree of difference 
between the political party of candidates and the three event categories; activist, influence, and 
voter events, will be determined. 
H4: The number and type of personal appearances for Democratic candidates will be different 
than the number and type of personal appearances for Republican candidates. 
 
 
The fifth hypothesis (H5) will be tested using a chi-squared (X2) test. The degree of difference 
between the financial standing of candidates and the three event categories; activist, influence, 
and voter events, will be determined. 
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H5: The number and type of personal appearances for first-tier fundraising candidates will be 
different than the number and type of personal appearances for second-tier fundraising 
candidates. 
 
 The question of which candidates to include is vital to examine. In addition to candidates 
who were on the New Hampshire ballot and had an active campaign at the time of voting, the 
author of this work included several candidates who dropped out, or suspended their campaign, 
prior to voting began (Chart 2-3). H1 through H5 were analyzed with dropout candidates being  
 
Chart 2-3: New Hampshire primary Dropout Candidates by Party and Election Year 
Election Year Party Dropout Candidates 
2008 Republicans None 
2008 Democrats Biden, Dodd 
2012 Republicans Bachmann, Cain, Johnson, McCotter, Pawlenty 
2016 Republicans Graham, Jindal, Pataki, Paul, Perry, Walker 
2016 Democrats Chafee, O'Malley, Webb 
Source: Appleman, 2008a, 2008b, 2012, 2016a, 2016b  
 
included in the analysis. However, it is reasonable to assume that candidates who drop out of the 
presidential race do not receive the same number of votes as they would have if they had not 
suspended their campaign. Given this dynamic, the analyses were conducted a second time, 
excluding dropout candidates. We will determine if any difference exists between both sets of 
analyses. Secondary data tables will be provided in the analysis section for hypothesis two and 
three, as their inclusion is vital to understanding the difference in results from removing dropout 
candidates. For hypothesis one, four, and five, removing the dropout candidates does not change 
the outcomes of the analysis. Therefore, the secondary tables will be added in Appendix E for 
reference.   
In addition to the five hypotheses, a multivariate regression analysis will be conducted to 
measure the impact of several predictors on the raw voting results of each primary. The five 
predictor variables are events, newspaper mentions, campaign finance, political party and 
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election year. This will tell us, when taken together, which variables, if any, have a significant 
impact on voting results. The events, news, and finance variables are drawn from the raw 
numbers attributed to each candidate (Descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix A, B, and 
D). The party affiliation of each candidate and the election year they belong to are set up as 
dummy variables. This will still allow for an analysis of all five variables.  
The t-statistic and the standardized beta will be used to determine if a variable has a 
significant effect on voting results. If there is no relationship between a variable and voting 
results, the t-statistic will have a value close to zero and if there is a relationship between a 
variable and voting results, the t-statistic will have a value in the single digits, such as one, two, 
or three. The standardized beta, as the name suggests, standardizes each predictor variable into 
the same unit. This allows for all five predictor variables to be measured in the same manner, so 
that we can compare each of them evenly to see the degree to which each has an effect on voting.  
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Chapter 3: Analysis  
Every four years, New Hampshire experiences extensive presidential campaign activity. 
Candidates flood the state looking to attract voters of New Hampshire. Understanding how and 
where candidates spend their time in New Hampshire will provide a base for a further 
understanding of the impact of presidential campaigns.  
 
Table 3-1: New Hampshire Primary Campaign Events by Year and Party 
Year Party Totals 
2008 Republicans 642 
  Democrats 819 
 (Combined)  1,461 
2012 Republicans 899 
2016 Republicans 1,470 
  Democrats 260 
 (Combined) 1,730 
Total 4,090 
Source: Appleman, 2008a, 2008b, 2012, 2016a, 2016b  
 
Table 3-1 displays the aggregate number of personal appearances by candidate, election 
years and party. There have been over four thousand campaign personal appearances by 
presidential candidates during the 2008, 2012, and 2016 presidential campaigns. Campaign 
appearances have increased each election cycle, from 2008 to 2012 by approximately 28%, and 
from 2012 to 2016 by approximately 63%. Table 3-2 lays out specific descriptive statistics on 
each election.  
According to the data, the average number of events per candidate has fluctuated 
overtime. The highest average number of events per candidate was during the 2008 New 
Hampshire Democratic primary, when the average was 117 events per candidate. The election 
with the highest number of candidates was the 2016 New Hampshire Republican primary, with 
 
17 candidates running for president. It is clear, from an aggregate point of view, that candidates
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Table 3-2: 2008, 2012, and 2016, New Hampshire Primary Descriptive Statistics for 
Personal Appearance Events 
Year 2008 2008 2012 2016 2016 
Party Republicans  Democrats Republicans Republicans Democrats 
Mean 92 117 75 86 52 
Median 115 108 53 89 70 
# of Candidates 7 7 12 17 5 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
  
Table 3-3: 2008 New Hampshire Republican Primary Candidate Events by County 
County Voters % Total  Events % Total Expected* Difference  
Belknap 18,257 5.27% 20 3.38% 31 -11 
Carroll 16,282 4.70% 27 4.57% 28 -1 
Cheshire 16,979 4.90% 19 3.21% 29 -10 
Coos 7,356 2.12% 30 5.08% 13 17 
Grafton 21,452 6.19% 48 8.12% 17 31 
Hillsborough 102,622 29.60% 243 41.12% 175 68 
Merrimack 40,716 11.74% 98 16.58% 69 29 
Rockingham 87,236 25.16% 113 19.12% 149 -36 
Strafford 25,638 7.39% 48 8.12% 44 4 
Sullivan 10,204 2.94% 6 0.85% 17 -11 
Totals 346,742  100% 652  100%   
*The ‘expected’ number of events formula: %Total Voters in County * Total Events = Expected Events per County. 
Source: New Hampshire Secretary of State, 2016b and Appleman, 2008a 
 
spend considerable time in New Hampshire, but candidates do not spread their time evenly 
throughout New Hampshire’s ten counties. 
 
H1: The more voters in a county, the more appearances candidates will hold.  
 
H1o: There is no relationship between the number of voters in a county and the number of 
candidate appearances.  
 
As Table 3-3 through 3-7 show, some counties in New Hampshire have more voters than 
others. It is important to be clear on how the number of voters in each county was tabulated. In 
each table, the voters column contains the number of registered voters in each county plus the 
number of registered independent voters in each county who voted in that party’s primary. For 
example, in Table 3-3 under Belknap county, there are 18,257 voters. This number contains the 
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number of registered Republicans in Belknap in 2008, 14,464 voters, plus the number of 
independent voters who voted in the Republican primary in 2008, 3,793 voters.  
Some counties, such as Hillsborough, see more candidate visits than expected given their 
population. By multiplying the percent of voters in a county by the total number of events for 
each party and each election cycle, we can determine what the expected number of events would  
 
Table 3-4: 2008 New Hampshire Democratic Primary Candidate Events by County 
County Voters % Total  Events % Total Expected*  Difference  
Belknap 15,038 3.95% 31 4.24% 29 2 
Carroll 15,079 3.97% 27 3.69% 29 -2 
Cheshire 25,265 6.64% 46 6.29% 49 -3 
Coos 9,966 2.62% 17 2.33% 19 -2 
Grafton 28,047 7.38% 64 8.76% 54 10 
Hillsborough 106,413 27.98% 287 39.26% 205 82 
Merrimack 44,014 11.57% 129 17.65% 85 44 
Rockingham 87,253 22.94% 134 18.33% 168 -34 
Strafford 36,438 9.58% 66 9.03% 70 -4 
Sullivan 12,778 3.36% 18 2.46% 25 -7 
Totals 380,291 100% 819 100%   
*The ‘expected’ number of events formula: %Total Voters in County * Total Events = Expected Events per County. 
Source: New Hampshire Secretary of State, 2016b and Appleman, 2008b 
 
have been in each county, all else being equal. For 2008, both Republican and Democratic 
candidates held a higher-than-expected number of events in Hillsborough county, the most 
populous county in New Hampshire. They also hold more events than expected in Merrimack, 
the third most populous county in New Hampshire. Interestingly, both parties held fewer-than-
expected number of events in the second most populous county; Rockingham county. The 
correlation (r=.929**) between the number of voters and the number of events in a county for the 
2008 New Hampshire Republican primary is statistically significant. This indicates a strong 
relationship between the number of voters and number of events in each county. The correlation 
(r=.940**) between the number of voters and the number of events in a county for the 2008 New 
Hampshire Democratic primary is statistically significant. This indicates a strong relationship 
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between the number of voters and number of events in each county for both parties during the 
2008 New Hampshire primary. This pattern persisted in upcoming cycles.  
 Republicans in 2012 behaved quite similarly to Republicans in 2008. In 2012, 
Republicans held more events than expected in Hillsborough county, 64 more events in 2012, 
similar to the 68 more events in Hillsborough in 2008 (Table 3-5). Additionally, in 2012 the 
Republicans held 19 fewer events than expected in Belknap county, which was down from 11 
less-than-expected events in 2008 (Table 3-3). Finally, Republicans again held fewer events than 
expected in Rockingham county, by the largest measure of any county that year, holding fifty 
less-than-expected number of campaign events in that area. The correlation (r=.956**) between 
the number of voters and the number of events in a county for the 2012 New Hampshire 
Republican primary is statistically significant.   
Table 3-5: 2012 New Hampshire Republican Primary Candidate Events by County 
County Voters % Total  Events % Total Expected*  Difference 
Belknap 19,892 5.54% 31 3.45% 50 -19 
Carroll 15,959 4.44% 42 4.67% 40 2 
Cheshire 17,781 4.95% 31 3.45% 45 -14 
Coos 7,199 2.00% 27 3.00% 18 9 
Grafton 21,720 6.05% 54 6.01% 54 0 
Hillsborough 106,994 29.80% 332 36.93% 268 64 
Merrimack 42,170 11.74% 135 15.02% 106 29 
Rockingham 91,023 25.35% 178 19.80% 228 -50 
Strafford 25,688 7.15% 57 6.34% 64 -7 
Sullivan 10,648 2.97% 12 1.33% 27 -15 
Totals 359,074  100% 899  100%    
*The ‘expected’ number of events formula: %Total Voters in County * Total Events = Expected Events per County. 
Source: New Hampshire Secretary of State, 2016b and Appleman, 2012 
 
For the 2016 election cycle, both Republicans and Democrats held their highest number 
of events in Hillsborough county, with 426 and 71 events respectively, and both parties held 
more events than expected: 158 events for Republicans and 16 events for Democrats (Table 3-6 
and 3-7). Republicans held far fewer events than expected in Rockingham county in 2016, -79  
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Table 3-6: 2016 New Hampshire Republican Primary Candidate Events by County 
County Voters % Total  Events % Total Expected* Difference 
Belknap 23,133 5.71% 63 4.29% 84 -21 
Carroll 17,995 4.44% 41 2.79% 65 -24 
Cheshire 18,757 4.63% 62 4.22% 68 -6 
Coos 8,126 2.00% 37 2.52% 29 8 
Grafton 24,099 5.95% 77 5.24% 87 -10 
Hillsborough 117,446 28.98% 584 39.73% 426 158 
Merrimack 45,685 11.27% 197 13.40% 166 31 
Rockingham 106,330 26.23% 307 20.88% 386 -79 
Strafford 31,778 7.84% 79 5.37% 115 -36 
Sullivan 11,983 2.96% 23 1.56% 43 -20 
Totals 405,332  100% 1,470  100%    
*The ‘expected’ number of events formula: %Total Voters in County * Total Events = Expected Events per County. 
Source: New Hampshire Secretary of State, 2016b and Appleman, 2016a 
 
fewer than expected. Democrats held six events less than expected in Grafton county. The 
correlation (r=.947**) between the number of voters and the number of events in a county for the 
2016 New Hampshire Republican primary is statistically significant. This indicates a strong 
relationship between the number of voters and number of events in each county. The correlation 
(r=.986**) between the number of voters and the number of events in a county for the 2016 New 
Hampshire Democratic primary is statistically significant. This indicates a strong relationship 
between the number of voters and number of events in each county. There is a relationship 
between the number of voters and the number of events in each county, party, and election cycle.  
Overall, the correlation (r=.812**) between the number of voters and the number of 
events in a county is statistically significant. This number is slightly lower than that of each 
individual primary, but it is nonetheless significant. This indicates a strong relationship between 
the number of voters and number of events in each county.  
It is clear from these statistics that not every county is treated equally by candidates. In 
particular, Republican and Democratic candidates continuously held fewer events in 
Rockingham county than would be expected by the county’s voting population (Tables 3-8 and 
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Table 3-7: 2016 New Hampshire Democratic Primary Candidate Events by County 
County Voters % Total  Events % Total  Expected* Difference 
Belknap 15,448 4.07% 7 2.70% 11 -4 
Carroll 13,810 3.64% 8 3.09% 9 -1 
Cheshire 25,733 6.78% 16 6.18% 18 -2 
Coos 8,411 2.22% 6 2.32% 6 0 
Grafton 31,785 8.38% 16 6.18% 22 -6 
Hillsborough 104,158 27.45% 87 33.59% 71 16 
Merrimack 43,670 11.51% 33 12.74% 30 3 
Rockingham 84,570 22.29% 55 21.24% 58 -3 
Strafford 39,663 10.45% 27 10.42% 27 0 
Sullivan 12,158 3.20% 4 1.54% 8 -4 
Totals 379,406  100% 260  100%    
*The ‘expected’ number of events formula: %Total Voters in County * Total Events = Expected Events per County. 
Source: New Hampshire Secretary of State, 2016b and Appleman, 2016b 
 
Table 3-8: Summary of Differences for Expected Number of Events by County 
Year 2008 2008 2012 2016 2016 
Party Republicans Democrats Republicans Republicans  Democrats 
Belknap -11 2 -19 -21 -4 
Carroll -1 -2 2 -24 -1 
Cheshire -10 -3 -14 -6 -2 
Coos 17 -2 9 8 0 
Grafton 31 10 0 -10 -6 
Hillsborough 68 82 64 158 16 
Merrimack 29 44 29 31 3 
Rockingham -36 -34 -50 -79 -3 
Strafford 4 -4 -7 -36 0 
Sullivan -11 -7 -15 -20 -4 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
Table 3-9: Campaign Activity by County –  
Differences Among Parties and Overall Average 
County Republican Democrat  Overall 
Belknap -17 -1 -11 
Carroll -8 -2 -6 
Cheshire -10 -3 -9 
Coos 11 -1 6 
Grafton 7 2 2 
Hillsborough 97 49 66 
Merrimack 30 24 22 
Rockingham -55 -19 -45 
Strafford -13 -2 -10 
Sullivan -16 -6 -12 




Table 3-10: Bi-Variate Correlation Coefficients for Number of Voters  
and Number of Events by County: 2008-2016 
Year Party r= 
2008 Republicans .929** 
2008 Democrats .940** 
2012 Republicans .956** 
2016 Democrats .947** 
2016 Republicans .986** 
Overall (Combined) .812** 
Source: Author’s Calculations.  
Levels of Significance: *P< 0.05 level, **P<0.01 level, ***P<0.00 level 
 
 
3-9). Yet, in every election, there remains a statistically significant correlation between the 
number of voters and number of candidate events in New Hampshire counties (Table 3-10). The 
number of events held by candidates does demonstrate that there is a high level of personal 
campaign activity by candidates. But the degree to which these events have an impact has yet to 
be established.
H2: The more appearances a candidate makes in New Hampshire, the higher their votes will be.  
 
H2o: There is no relationship between the time a candidate spends in New Hampshire and vote 
share.  
 
 To test this hypothesis, we will calculate the number of events and the vote total of 
candidates. To begin, contextualizing each primary, beginning with the 2008 New Hampshire 
Republican primary, is vital.  
 The 2008 New Hampshire Republican primary marked the return of a pivotal figure in 
the New Hampshire narrative. McCain, who was the winner of the 2000 New Hampshire 
Republican primary, and the runner-up to nominee George W. Bush for the 2000 GOP 
nomination, did not have an easy path to the nomination 2008 GOP nomination. By the summer 
of 2007, McCain’s campaign cash had largely been spent forcing the campaign to shift to a 
strategy that focused on New Hampshire. McCain had close rivals, including New Hampshire’s 
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next-door neighbor, Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, 
former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani, Texas Congressmen Ron Paul, as well as several 
lesser-known candidates, such as former Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson and 
Congressman Duncan Hunter of California (Smith, Moore, 2015).  
 Candidates approached New Hampshire differently. Giuliani largely skipped New 
Hampshire, Paul focused his energy on the libertarian coalition of New Hampshire Republicans, 
and Romney split time between Iowa and New Hampshire, hoping a win in Iowa would catapult 
him in front of McCain for a win in New Hampshire. McCain, however, focused his campaign 
on New Hampshire, largely by the face to face campaigning he did in 2000. In the end, McCain 
won the 2008 New Hampshire Republican primary with 38% of the vote, Romney trailed 
McCain with 32% of the vote, and Huckabee managed 11% of the vote, with the remaining 
candidates ending up in the single digits (Appendix A). 
 
Source: The New York Times, 2008 and Appleman, 2008a 
  
Not every candidate held the same number of events as others. McCain held the largest 
number of events for Republicans in 2008 with 154 events (Figure 3-1). Candidates who spent 
more time in the state, and held more events, received more votes than candidates who spent less 
McCain Romney Huckabee Giuliani Paul Thompson Hunter
Votes 88,571 75,546 26,859 20,439 18,308 2,894 1,225




































Figure 3-1: 2008 New Hampshire Republican Primary: Number of Votes 
and Number of Events by Candidate
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time in New Hampshire. The correlation (r=.864*) between the number of events and the number 
of votes in the 2008 Republican primary is significant (Table 3-11). However, this pattern does 
not hold for the 2008 Democratic primary or later primaries.  
 The early front-runner for the 2008 New Hampshire Democratic primary was New York 
Senator Hillary Clinton, who enjoyed the support of powerful Granite State political figures such 
and Bill and Jeanne Shaheen, who helped to keep Clinton on top of the polls (Conway, 2017). 
Among the New Hampshire Democratic elites in 2008, there was certainly jockeying for the 
right candidate. Jim Demers, longtime Democratic operative in Concord, New Hampshire, 
shifted his support during the primary from, former North Carolina Senator John Edwards, who 
he supported in 2004, to Illinois Senator Barack Obama, an unknown candidate at the start of the 
campaign season. Clinton, Obama, and Edwards were joined by New Mexico Governor Bill 
Richardson, as well as Congressman Dennis Kucinich of Ohio, Senator Joe Biden of Delaware 
and Senator Chris Dodd of Connecticut (Smith, Moore 2015).  
 Both Clinton and Obama were late to hold events in New Hampshire in 2008 for several 
reasons: both campaigns needed to amass a large amount of resources and Iowa was critical in 
2008 for Democrats (Smith, Moore, 2015). Candidates who did engage in retail politics, such as 
Edwards, did not make a tangible difference in persuading voters. In the end, Clinton won the 
2008 New Hampshire Democratic primary with 39% of the vote, narrowly defeating Obama, 
who received 37% of the vote. Edwards received a modest 17% of the vote, and the remaining 
candidates ending up in the single digits (Appendix A). 
 Richardson and Edwards held far more events than other candidates, but the number of 
events does not correlate with vote share. The correlation (r=-.04) between the number of events 
and the number of votes is not significant (Table 3-11).  
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Source: The New York Times, 2008 and Appleman, 2008b 
 
Just as McCain emerged as the Republican front-runner in 2008 after falling to the 
establishment’s choice in 2000, Romney, after falling to McCain in 2008, came into the 2012 
New Hampshire Republican race as the “prohibitive front-runner” (Smith, Moore 2015). As has 
traditionally been the case in Republican presidential nomination contests, Romney believed it 
was his turn. Utah Governor Jon Huntsman, one of Romney’s challengers, was also taking a 
page out of the Republican playbook, namely, McCain’s blueprint on how to win New 
Hampshire.  
During the fall of 2011, Huntsman moved his operations to New Hampshire, where he 
put all of his hopes on winning the nomination on the voters of New Hampshire. “What 
Huntsman offered the Republican electorate was a dose of sanity in a deeply unsettled 
Republican race that was replete with colorful characters of dubious viability,” (Conroy 2017, p. 
215). Other major Republicans included Ron Paul, former House of Representatives Speaker 
Newt Gingrich, former Senator Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania, Texas Governor Rick Perry, as 
well as several candidates who received notoriety during the campaign, but nonetheless dropped 
Clinton Obama Edwards Richardson Kucinich Biden Dodd
Votes 112,404 104,815 48,699 13,269 3,891 638 205




































Figure 3-2: 2008 New Hampshire Democratic Primary: Number of Votes and 
Number of Events by Candidate
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out before voting began in New Hampshire such as Congresswomen Michele Bachmann of 
Minnesota, Herman Cain, and Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty.  
In the end, Romney received the 2012 New Hampshire Republican primary, amassing 
40% of the vote, far outpacing his closest rivals, Paul (23%), Huntsman (17%), and Gingrich 
(10%), with the remaining candidates ending up in the single digits (Appendix A). 
The 2012 New Hampshire Republican primary saw far more candidates than the 2008 
Republican primary did. The candidate who held the most events was Huntsman, who held 207 
events. Similar to the Democrats in 2008, the winner of the 2012 New Hampshire Republican 
primary, Mitt Romney, did not hold the most events (Figure 3-3). The correlation (r=.477) between 
the number of events and the number of votes for the 2012 Republicans is not significant (Table 
3-11).  
The 2016 New Hampshire Republican primary came after eight years of Democratic 
control of the White House. Romney, the 2012 GOP nominee, declined to run. While the 
Republican establishment fought over the possible replacements for Romney, the emerging 
front-runner, Donald Trump, was thought of as a “delightful and utterly harmless joke,” (Conroy 
2017, p.130). Unlike during the 2012 New Hampshire Republican primary, where only one 
candidate adopted McCain’s New Hampshire strategy of relying only on New Hampshire, the 
2016 race saw several candidates adopt this strategy; Governor John Kasich of Ohio, Governor 
Jeb Bush of Florida, Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey, Carly Fiorina, George Pataki, and 
Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina. Trump was joined by sixteen additional Republican 
candidates (Appendix A).  
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In the end, Trump won the 2016 New Hampshire primary easily, with 36% of the vote. 
The remaining candidates who managed double-digit vote percentages was an amalgamation of 
the establishment, as well as Texas Senator Ted Cruz, who received a boost after narrowly 
winning the Iowa caucus. Trump outpaced his rivals, Kasich (16%), Cruz (12%), and both 
Governor Bush and Senator Rubio (11%), with the remaining candidates ending up in the single 
digits (Appendix A). 
The 2016 New Hampshire Republican primary also had a large number of major 
candidates, 17. Graham held the most events, 180, followed close behind by Christie and Kasich 
with 177 and 169 events respectively. Trump, the winner of the New Hampshire primary, held 
43 events. It is no surprise that the correlation (r=.107) between the number of events and the 
number of votes for the 2016 Republicans is not significant (Table 3-11). The results from the 
2016 New Hampshire Republican primary do not support the conventional wisdom, that one 
must campaign personally in New Hampshire in order to win the primary.  
The 2016 New Hampshire Democratic primary would have been a foregone conclusion, 
if it had not been for New Hampshire’s neighbor, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders entering the 
race. Hillary Clinton won the New Hampshire primary in 2008 but lost the nomination to 
Obama. However, Clinton had overwhelming support from the Democratic establishment in 
2008 and in 2016. “Clinton was a shoe in for the Democratic nomination, roughly as likely to 
lose her party’s nod as she was to succumb to an asteroid landing directly on her head” (Conroy 
2017, p.130). The Sanders campaign was originally ignored by the press.  
In the beginning, the contrast between the Sanders and Clinton campaigns is indicative of 
this inequality of support among the establishment. The Clinton campaign had the 
professionalism feel of a Fortune 500 company, calling her volunteers fellows instead of interns 
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as is the case with every other campaign. The Sanders team had little money, but ardent 
volunteers. Clinton and Sanders were joined by former Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley, 
and two relatively unknown challengers, former Virginia Senator Jim Webb, and former Rhode 
Island Governor Lincoln Chafee. In the end, Sanders won easily with 61% to Clinton’s 38% of 
the vote. The remaining three candidates did not break 1% of the vote (Appendix A).   
Sanders, held more events in New Hampshire, 78, than any other Democrat. However, he 
was closely followed by both O’Malley and Clinton, who held 73 and 70 events, respectively 
(Figure 3-5). The correlation (r=.819) between the number of events and the number of votes for 
the 2016 Democrats is not significant (Table 3-11). This is a considerably stronger relationship 
between any other election in this study except the 2008 GOP primary. This is largely because 
top candidates held a similar number of events.   
Overall, the correlation between the number of events held by candidates and the number 
of votes cast for candidates for the five elections in this study (r=2.84) is not significant (Table 3-
11). There is no overall relationship between events held by candidates and votes they receive. 
This leads us to fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between events and 
votes. However, there is a relationship between events held by candidates and votes during the 
2008 New Hampshire Republican primary, and there is a closer association between the two 
variables for the 2016 New Hampshire Democratic primary, indicating that in two primaries, 
candidate appearances mattered.  
Table 3-11. Bi-Variate Correlation Coefficients for Voting Results on Events: 2008-2016 
Year Party r= 
2008 Republicans .864* 
2008 Democrats -0.04 
2012 Republicans 0.477 
2016 Republicans 0.107 
2016 Democrats 0.819 
Overall (Combined) 0.284 
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Source: Author’s Calculations 
Levels of Significance: *P< 0.05 level, **P<0.01 level, ***P<0.00 level 
 
Table 3-12. Bi-Variate Correlation Coefficients for Voting Results on Events: 2008-2016, 
Excluding Dropout Candidates 
Year Party r= 
2008 Republicans .864* 
2008 Democrats -0.462 
2012 Republicans 0.458 
2016 Republicans 0.085 
Overall (Combined) 0.216 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Levels of Significance: *P< 0.05 level, **P<0.01 level, ***P<0.00 level 
 
 Sixteen candidates were included in the analysis who dropped out before voting began in 
New Hampshire (Chart 2-3). It is important to see if taking these candidates out of the analysis 
changes our conclusions. During the 2016 New Hampshire Democratic primary, the correlation 
between votes and events changed dramatically. After accounting for candidate dropouts, 
Sanders and Clinton were the only two remaining Democratic candidates. Because of this, the 
correlation between the number of votes and the number of events is 1, and cannot be calculated, 
so this election year was removed (Table 3-12).   
 The overall correlation between votes and events declines somewhat when dropout 
candidates are removed from the analysis, from r=.284 to r=.216, and does not change the 
conclusions that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between events 
and votes (Table 3-12).  
In addition to the goal of gaining votes by directly holding personal appearances, 
campaigns also look to gain media momentum by spending time in New Hampshire. This begs 
the question, to what extent does time spent campaigning in New Hampshire impact media 








H3: The more candidate appearances New Hampshire, the more New Hampshire newspaper 
name mentions they receive.  
 
H3o: There is no relationship between the number of candidate appearances and the number the 
number of New Hampshire newspaper mentions they receive
 
The relationship between campaign events and news mentions during the 2008 New 
Hampshire Republican primary behave in a similar manner to the relationship between campaign 
events and votes; the number of news mentions for each candidate strongly correlates with 
candidate vote share. The winner of the 2008 New Hampshire Republican primary, McCain, had 
the highest number of newspaper name mentions among Republicans in 2008 (993). Romney, 
who came in second in 2008, had the second highest number of newspaper name mentions (819) 
(Figure 3-6). The bivariate correlation (r=.891*) between news stories and candidate personal 
appearances for the 2008 New Hampshire Republican primary is significant (Table 3-13). This 
indicates that campaigning in New Hampshire resulted in more media coverage.  
For Republicans in 2008, as the number of newspaper name mentions increased, the 
number votes increased. This trend continues for the 2008 New Hampshire Democratic primary.  
The number of newspaper mentions correctly predicted the winner of the 2008 New 
Sanders Clinton O'Malley Webb Chafee
Votes 151,584 95,252 643 0 0




































Figure 3-5: 2016 New Hampshire Democratic Primary: Number of 
Votes and Number of Events by Candidate
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Source: The New York Times, 2008 and Union Leader, 2016 and Concord Monitor, 2016 
 
 
Source: The New York Times, 2008 and Union Leader, 2016 and Concord Monitor, 2016 
 
 
Hampshire Democratic primary. The top Democratic candidates in 2008, Clinton and Obama, 
received nearly half of the total news mentions; 1212 mentions for Clinton and 1025 mentions 
for Obama (Figure 3-7). This figure contrasts with the trends of personal appearances for 
Democratic candidates in 2008. The bivariate correlation (r=.116) between news stories and 
candidate personal appearances for the 2008 New Hampshire Democratic primary is 
McCain Romney Huckabee Giuliani Paul Thompson Hunter
Votes 88,571 75,546 26,859 20,439 18,308 2,894 1,225
















































Figure 3-6: 2008 New Hampshire Republican Primary: 
Number of Votes and Number of Newspaper Name Mentions 
by Candidate
Clinton Obama Edwards Richardson Kucinich Biden Dodd
Votes 112,404 104,815 48,699 13,269 3,891 638 205
















































Figure 3-7: 2008 New Hampshire Democratic Primary: 
Number of Votes and Number of Newspaper Name Mentions 
by Candidate
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insignificant (Table 3-13). This means that, for Democrats in 2008, newspaper name mentions is 
not related to the amount of time spent in New Hampshire. 
This was less of the case in 2016, where some candidates, such as Christie, did not have a 
large vote share, but was mentioned by newspapers often. For the 2016 New Hampshire 
Republican primary, the candidate with the most number of newspaper name mentions also had 
the highest number of votes; Trump, with 100,406 votes and 782 news mentions (Figure 3-9).  
The 2016 New Hampshire Democratic primary is the only election in this study where 
the candidate with the most newspaper name mentions did not also have the most votes. Sanders 
won the 2016 New Hampshire Democratic primary with 151,584 votes and received 624 
newspaper name mentions. Clinton came in second place during the 2016 New Hampshire 
Democratic primary with 95,252 votes but received the highest number of newspaper name 
mentions, 1,002 mentions (Figure 3-10).  
The 2016 New Hampshire Democratic primary also had a statistically significantly 
correlation between newspaper name mentions and the number of personal appearances, a value 
of .880. Candidates who held more personal appearances also received a fair amount of 
newspaper coverage. Overall, the bivariate correlation (r=.259) value for the relationship 
between personal appearances and newspaper mentions is very weak (Table 3-13). The number 
of news mentions did a consistently better job of predicting the winner of each primary than the 
number of personal appearances did.  
The correlation between events and newspaper mentions is significant in only two of the 
five cases; the 2008 New Hampshire Republican primary (r=.891*) and the 2016 New 
Hampshire Democratic primary (r=.880*). Given that in three of the five cases there is no 
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relationship between personal appearances by candidates and candidate newspaper name 
mentions, we fail to reject the null hypothesis.  
We must again take into account the 16 candidates included in the analysis who dropped 
out of the presidential race before voting began in New Hampshire (Chart 2-3). As a result of 
removing the dropout candidates from the analysis, the correlation between events and 
newspaper mentions during the 2008 New Hampshire Democratic primary decreased from 0.116 
to -0.227. During the 2016 New Hampshire Democratic primary, the relationship between events 
and newspaper mentions changed in the same manner as it did during the second hypothesis. 
After accounting for candidate dropouts, Sanders and Clinton are the only two remaining 
Democratic candidates. Because of this, the correlation becomes 1, which implies a perfect 
correlation (Table 3-14). The overall correlation between events and newspaper mentions 
increases to .357* and becomes statistically significant when removing the dropout candidates 
from the analysis (Table 3-14).  
In addition to whether candidates receive votes or news stories from events in New 
Hampshire, the number of personal appearances by presidential candidates may shed light on 
political party and campaign finance trends. The literature points to several differences among 
Republican and Democratic nomination campaigns. Whether or not there are any differences 
among the number and type of campaign personal appearances from either party will help 
determine if these national trends are present in New Hampshire.  
Of the three event categories, activist, influence, and voter events, the voter events 
category is by far the largest, accounting for 59% of the total events for all election cycles or to 
be more precise, 2,423 out of the 4,090 events being examined (Table 3-15). Cross-tabulating the 
three event categories on both parties for the 2008 and 2016 election cycles, there are a number  
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Source: The New York Times, 2016 and Union Leader, 2016 and Concord Monitor, 2016 
  
 
Table 3-13. Bi-Variate Correlation Coefficients for Personal Appearances and Newspaper 
Mentions: 2008-2016 
Year Party r= 
2008 Republicans .891** 
2008 Democrats 0.116 
2012 Republicans 0.394 
2016 Republicans 0.303 
2016 Democrats .880* 
Overall (Combined) .259 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Levels of Significance: *P< 0.05 level, **P<0.01 level, ***P<0.00 level 
   
Table 3-14. Bi-Variate Correlation Coefficients for Personal Appearances and Newspaper 
Mentions: 2008-2016, Excluding Dropout Candidates 
Year Party r= 
2008 Republicans .879** 
2008 Democrats -0.227 
2012 Republicans 0.301 
2016 Republicans 0.310 
Overall (Combined) .357* 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Levels of Significance: *P< 0.05 level, **P<0.01 level, ***P<0.00 level 
Sanders Clinton O'Malley Webb Chafee
Votes 151,584 95,252 643 0 0
















































Figure 3-10: 2016 New Hampshire Democratic Primary: 
Number of Votes and Number of Newspaper Name Mentions 
by Candidate
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of differences between the types of events Republicans and Democrats hold. The 2012 New 
Hampshire primary had only one party, therefore it could not be included in the analysis here. 
H4: The number and type of personal appearances for Democratic candidates will be different 
than the number and type of personal appearances for Republican candidates.  
 
H4o: There is no difference between the number and type of personal appearances between 
Democratic and Republican candidates.  
 
There are differences between the number and type of campaign events held by 
Republican candidates and Democratic candidates during the 2008 New Hampshire primary. 
Activist events accounted for 25% of the total events held by Republicans in 2008. For 
Democrats, activist events accounted for 39% of the total events in 2008. For voter events,
Table 3-15: Personal Appearances by Category and Event Type, 2008, 2012, and 2016 New 
Hampshire Primaries 
Category Event Type Count % Total 
Activist Campaign Activist Event 294 7% 
  Electioneering 103 3% 
  Official Party Event 342 8% 
  Private House Party 314 8% 
  Rally/GOTV Event 148 4% 
  Watch Party 42 1% 
  Category Total 1243 30% 
Influence Facility Tour 143 3% 
  Meeting with E-Board 39 1% 
  VIP Meeting 105 3% 
  Roundtable 137 3% 
  Category Total 424 10% 
Voter Meet and Greet 1095 27% 
  Parade 33 1% 
  Policy Speech 413 10% 
  Town Hall 882 22% 
  Category Total 2423 59% 
Total   4090 100% 
Source: Appleman, 2008, 2012, and 2016 
 
the difference between Republicans and Democrats is larger. For Republicans in 2008, voter 
events accounted for 64% of the total events held by Republicans, while for Democrats, voter  
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Table 3-16: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and Party, 2008  
Type of Event Republicans Democrats Total 
Activist 25% (163) 39% (319) 33% (482) 
Influence 11% (68) 7% (61) 9% (129) 
Voter 64% (411) 54% (439) 58% (850) 
        
Total 100% (642)  100% (819) 100% (1461) 
X2= 36.452, P<.001     
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 events accounted for 54% of the total events held by Democrats. The chi-square statistic 
(X2=36.452) for the 2008 New Hampshire primary is significant (Table 3-16). The differences 
between Democratic and Republican candidates extend to the 2016 New Hampshire primary as 
well.  
Table 3-17: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and Party, 2016 
Type of Event Republicans Democrats Total 
Activist 26% (384) 45% (116) 29% (500) 
Influence 12% (179) 7% (19) 11% (198) 
Voter 62% (907) 48% (125) 60% (1032) 
        
Total 100% (1470) 100% (260) 100% (1730)  
X2= 37.269, P<.001     
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
There are differences between the number and type of campaign events held for  
Republican and Democratic candidates during the 2016 New Hampshire primary. Activist events 
accounted for 26% of the total events held by Republican candidates in 2016. Activist events 
accounted for 45% of the total events held by Democrats in 2016. For Republicans in 2016, voter 
events accounted for 62% of the total events held by Republicans. For Democrats in 2016, voter 
events accounted for 48% of the total events held by Democrats. The chi-square statistic 
(X2=37.269) for the 2016 New Hampshire primary is significant (Chart 3-17). For the 2008 and 
the 2016 New Hampshire primaries, there is a statistically significant difference between the 
number and type of events held by Republican candidates and Democratic candidates.  
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Republican candidates held more voter events and less activist events. For the 2008 and 
2016 presidential election cycles, Republicans held a higher than expected number of voter 
events such as Town Halls, Meet and Greets, or Policy Speeches. Democrats held a higher than 
expected number of activist events such as House Parties, Rallies, and Party Sponsored Events. 
We arrive at this expectation by referencing the percent total of activist and voter events for each 
cycle. There are differences in the number and type of campaign events each party puts on. There 
are also differences among the number and type of personal appearances for candidates of 
different finance levels.  
Some candidates raise a lot of campaign financing leading up to early primaries and 
caucuses. Seeing if first-tier fundraising candidates campaign differently in New Hampshire than 
second-tier fundraising candidates is crucial to understand the degree to which campaign 
personal appearances in New Hampshire reflects national trends. In the end, there are several 
differences in the number and type of campaign personal appearances put on by those in the first-
tier fundraising group and those in the second-tier fundraising group.  
H5: The number and type of personal appearances by first-tier fundraising candidates will be 
different than second-tier fundraising candidates.  
 
H5o: There is no difference between the number and type of personal appearances by first-tier 
fundraising candidates and second-tier fundraising candidates.  
 
It is wise to recall the categorization of the first-tier fundraising group and the second-tier 
fundraising group for this analysis. Norrander’s work “The Attrition Game”, argues that the 
dividing mark for first-tier and second-tier fundraising candidates is $20 million dollars raised 
during the exhibition season. Therefore, $20 million raised, both for campaign fundraising and 
outside spending, will be the tier breaking point for both the Republicans and Democrats in 
2008. Norrander wrote her work in 2004. To adjust this tier breaking point for the 2012 and 2016 
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elections, the breaking point will shift depending on how the average fundraising levels for 
candidates above $20 million changed for the 2012 and 2016 election cycles.   
For the 2012 Republicans, the average fundraising totals for first tier presidential 
candidates, those who raised more than $20 million dollars during the exhibition season, 
decreased from the first tier average of 2008 ($55,899,83) to 2012 ($43,604,447). Given the 
approximately 20% decline, the tier break for the 2012 Republicans will be $16 million. Finally, 
in 2016 ($67,848,621) the average jumped to, or a 21% increase from 2008. The tier break for 
2016 Republicans jumps to $24 million in 2016. A specific breakdown of candidate tiers can be 
found in Appendix D.  
There are differences with the number and type of campaign events between each finance 
tier during the 2008 New Hampshire Republican primary. Activist events accounted for 20% of  
Table 3-18: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and Finance Tier, 2008 
New Hampshire Republican Primary 
Type of Event First-Tier Second-Tier Total 
Activist 20% (99) 42% (64) 25% (163) 
Influence 10% (47) 14% (21) 11% (68) 
Voter 70% (344) 44% (67) 64% (411) 
        
Total 100% (490) 100% (152) 100% (642) 
X2= 36.038, P<.001     
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
the total events for first-tier fundraising candidates, while activist events accounted for 42% of 
the total events held by second-tier fundraising candidates. Voter events accounted for 70% of 
the total events for first-tier fundraising candidates, while voter events accounted for 44% of the 
total events for second-tier fundraising candidates. The chi-square statistic (X2=36.038) for the 
2008 New Hampshire Republican primary is significant (Table 3-18).  
There are differences with the number and type of campaign events between each finance 
tier during the 2008 New Hampshire Democratic primary. For this election, while 36% of the 
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total events were activist events for first-tier fundraising candidates, for second-tier fundraising 
candidates, activist events accounted for 45% of the total events held. Similarly, voter events 
accounted for 56% of the total events for first-tier fundraising candidates, while voter events 
only accounted for 48% of the total events for second-tier fundraising candidates. The chi-square 
statistic (X2=6.22) is significant (Table 3-19).  
There are minimal differences with the number and type of campaign events between 
each finance tier during the 2012 New Hampshire Republican primary. For first-tier fundraising 
candidates, 28% of the total events were activist events, for second-tier fundraising candidates, 
activist events accounted for 29% of the total events held. There is little difference between the 
two tiers. Similarly, voter events accounted for 64% of the total events for first-tier fundraising 
candidates, while voter events only accounted for 60% of the total events for second-tier 
fundraising candidates. While the percent difference with voter events is slightly larger, this 
distinction does not align with the degree of difference from the first two elections. The chi-
square (X2=3.543) is not significant. There is little difference in the number and type of 
campaign events between the tiers for Republicans in 2012 (Table 3-20). Differences emerge 
once again during the 2016 New Hampshire Republican primary.  
There are differences with the number and type of campaign events between each finance 
tier during the 2016 New Hampshire Republican primary. For first-tier fundraising candidates, 
22% of the total events were activist events, for second-tier fundraising candidates, activist 
events accounted for 30% of the total events. Similarly, for first-tier fundraising candidates, voter 
events accounted for 69% of the total events. For second-tier fundraising candidates, voter events 
accounted for 55% of the total events. The chi-square statistic (X2=34.42) is statistically 
significant (Table 3-21).  
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Table 3-19: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and Finance Tier, 2008 
New Hampshire Democratic Primary 
Type of Event First-Tier Second-Tier Total 
Activist 36% (195) 45% (127) 39% (322) 
Influence 7% (40) 7% (21) 7% (61) 
Voter 56% (302) 48% (134) 53% (436) 
        
Total 100% (537) 100% (282) 100% (819) 
X2= 6.22, P<.05     
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
Table 3-20: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and Finance Tier, 2012 
New Hampshire Republican Primary 
Type of Event First-Tier Second-Tier Total 
Activist 28% (215) 30% (136) 29% (261) 
Influence 9% (42) 12% (55) 11% (97) 
Voter 64% (284) 57% (257) 60% (541) 
        
Total 100% (451) 100% (448) 100% (899) 
X2= 3.543 P>.001       
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
Table 3-21: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and Finance Tier, 2016 
New Hampshire Republican Primary 
Type of Event First-Tier Second-Tier Total 
Activist 22% (154) 30% (228) 26% (382) 
Influence 9% (63) 15% (116) 12% (179) 
Voter 69% (492) 55% (417) 62% (909) 
        
Total 100% (709) 100% (761) 100% (1470) 
X2= 34.42, P<.001     
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
Table 3-22: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and Finance Tier, 2016 
New Hampshire Democratic Primary 
Type of Event First-Tier Second-Tier Total 
Activist 46% (68) 42% (47) 44% (115) 
Influence 5% (7) 11% (12) 7% (19) 
Voter 49% (73) 47% (52) 48% (125) 
        
Total 100% (148) 100% (111) 100% (259) 
X2= 3.464 P>.001       
Source: Author’s Calculations 
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There are few differences with the number and type of campaign events between each 
finance tier during the 2016 New Hampshire Democratic primary. For first-tier fundraising 
candidates, 46% of the total events were activist events, for second-tier fundraising candidates,  
activist events accounted for 44% of the total events held. Similarly, voter events accounted for 
49% of the total events for first-tier fundraising candidates, while voter events only accounted 
for 48% of the total events for second-tier fundraising candidates. There is effectively no 
difference between the two tiers. The chi-square (X2=3.464) is not significant (Table 3-22). The 
2016 Democratic primary has the smallest chi-square statistic of all five elections in this study. 
This means that the candidates in the 2016 New Hampshire Democratic primary campaigned 
similarly to one another, regardless of the level of campaign finance.  
 In two of the five elections studied, there are statistically significant differences in the  
type of events held by first-tier fundraising candidates and second-tier fundraising candidates 
(2008 and 2016 Republican primaries). In one of the elections studied, the relationship was 
slightly statistically significant (2008 Democratic primary). Finally, during two of the elections 
studied, there is no statistically significant relationship between the number and type of 
campaign events held by first-tier fundraising candidates and second tier fundraising candidates 
(2012 Republican and 2016 Democratic primaries). Given the mixed results from the five 
elections, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, that there is no relationship between the 
fundraising tier a candidate belongs to and the number and type of primary campaign events they 
hold. Campaign financing may have an impact on the number and type of campaign personal 
appearances by candidates.  
To provide for a broad view on the effectiveness of each variable: events, news, 
campaign finance, political party, and election year, a multiple regression analysis was  
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conducted (Table 3-24). This analysis includes data from the five elections in this study.  
For each variable, the t-statistic and the standardized beta are included to display the degree of 
Table 3-23: Multiple Regression  
Analysis of Primary Campaign  
Variables on Voting Results 
Variables Model 1 
Events -0.168 
  -0.015 
News 3.658*** 
  0.631 
Finance 1.864 
  0.285 
Party 0.438 
  0.036 
Election Year 1.251 
  0.108 
N  47 
R2 0.748 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Levels of Significance: *P< 0.05 level, **P<0.01 level, ***P<0.00 level 
 
 
Table 3-24: Multiple Regression  
Analysis of Primary Campaign  
Variables on Voting Results,  
Excluding Candidate Dropouts 
Variables Model 1 
Events -0.413 
  -0.050 
News 3.360* 
  0.749 
Finance .551 
  0.111 
Party 0.676 
  0.084 
Election Year 1.506 
  0.183 
N  31 
R2 0.715 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
Levels of Significance: *P< 0.05 level, **P<0.01 level, ***P<0.00 level 
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significance exists with any of the variables. Only one variable was found to be statistically 
significantly correlated to higher vote shares; news. The events variable is not only 
insignificantly correlated to votes, the events t-statistic is a negative number. 
The finance variable is also worth examining. While not statistically significantly 
correlated to votes, the variable’s t-statistic, 1.864, is the second highest t-statistic in the model 
(Table 3-23). Campaign finance is a vital campaign metric to predict voting results. Financing is 
certainly more closely correlated to votes than events are. In the end, the only variable that stands 
out during primary campaigns is news coverage.  
We must again take into account the 16 candidates included in the analysis who dropped 
out of the presidential race before voting began in New Hampshire (Chart 1-3). As a result of 
removing the dropout candidates from the analysis, the degree of significance the predictor 
variable “News” is on voting results becomes less significant. It decreases in value by about .3, 
and is now only significant at the .05 level, but nevertheless remains the only significant 
predictor on voting results for the New Hampshire primary (Table 3-24).   
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 
The New Hampshire narrative tells a romantic story about the first in the nation primary. 
This narrative draws from decades of anecdotal stories about retail politics. In 1952, Tennessee 
Senator Estes Kefauver reportedly remembered the names of every Democratic activist he met 
when visiting New Hampshire (Scala 2003). President Jimmy Carter stood outside factory doors 
in 1976, shaking the hands of working-class voters as they began their nine to five (Kamarck 
2016). The most articulate summary of the New Hampshire narrative comes from Charles 
Brereton (1987) in his work First in the Nation.  
“But the most persuasive argument for keeping New Hampshire first is a serious one. In 
New Hampshire, presidential candidates must campaign ‘retail,’ in a brand of person-to-
person politics that requires candidates to answer real questions, some silly, from voters. 
There is something admirably democratic about a presidential candidate standing at a 
factory gate, pleading his case to blue-collar Americans who pack a lunch and punch a 
clock. In that democratic exchange, the candidates and maybe the country are the 
beneficiaries.”  
 
The romanticism of the New Hampshire narrative has reverberating effects. Some 
presidential candidates put all of their resources into New Hampshire on the notion that only in 
New Hampshire could they expect to win over voters. During the 2012 New Hampshire 
Republican primary, Jon Huntsman placed all of his campaign resources in New Hampshire, 
relying on retail politics (Griffin 2012). When asked how he wanted to be remembered by New 
Hampshire voters, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie replied “that I did it (campaigned) the 
way New Hampshire wants you to do it” (WMUR 2016).  
 The descriptive statistics show that New Hampshire does receive attention from 
candidates. Over the past three election cycles, New Hampshire has seen over four-thousand 
campaign events with presidential candidates. But, interestingly enough, not every county is 
treated the same.  
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 Jones (1998) argues that candidates spend their time in heavily populated areas of a state. 
The data show that Hillsborough county, the most populated county in New Hampshire, not only 
holds the most events each year, but also consistently receives more events than expected, given 
the number of registered voters in the county. In addition to the population advantages, there are 
a number of other factors to consider when trying to assign causality to this trend.  
Hillsborough is home to the New Hampshire’s only major airport, the Manchester-Boston 
Regional Airport. Unless candidates arrive in Boston, Manchester is their primary entry point 
into the state. Hillsborough is also home to the New Hampshire’s largest newspaper, The Union 
Leader, and the only statewide television station, WMUR. If candidates are looking to not only 
meet voters, but also to receive media attention while doing so, Hillsborough is the best option. 
Finally, Hillsborough is home to the SNHU Arena, the largest indoor venue in New Hampshire. 
If a candidate is looking to put on a large event, or attend a large event at the venue, 
Hillsborough is where they will have to be. Interestingly enough, Jones’ hypothesis, that 
candidates spend more time in more populated areas, does not hold up in Rockingham County, 
the second highest populated county in New Hampshire.  
Rockingham consistently saw fewer candidate events than expected given the number of 
voters in the county. During the 2008 Republican primary campaign, Rockingham county hosted 
only 19% of the total events, although it had 25% of voters. Furthermore, in 2016, Rockingham 
hosted 21% of the events by candidates but was home to 26% of the total Republican voters in 
the state. There are several possible explanations for this trend.  
Given Rockingham county’s proximity to Hillsborough County, campaigns might simply 
decide to spend more time in the larger and more convenient county rather than traveling to the 
neighboring county. Future research into the degree of population density between the two 
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counties would help explain this. If Hillsborough is denser than Rockingham, then it would make 
sense why campaigns would prefer Hillsborough over Rockingham in that there is less time and 
money needed to travel. Finally, this trend could simply be spurious in nature.  
Campaign staffers think of the county when they consider where to send their candidate. 
Instead of looking at the number of voters in the county, campaign staff may simply be tailoring 
campaign schedules to other factors such as a favoritism of one area of the state or out of 
personal experience, or convenience. Nevertheless, there is a consistently significant relationship 
between the number of voters and the number of events in each county (Table 3-10). Therefore, 
we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a relationship between the two variables. 
The data show that not every county in New Hampshire enjoys the same amount of attention 
from presidential candidates.  
 Our second hypothesis (H2) argues the more personal appearances a candidate holds in 
New Hampshire, the more votes they will receive. This hypothesis is not supported in four of the 
five elections studied, the exception being the 2008 New Hampshire Republican primary. In the 
other four primary elections, there is no significant correlation between number of events and 
vote totals, although the correlation for the 2016 New Hampshire Democratic primary 
approaches significance (Table 3-12).   
Given the results, we fail to reject the null hypothesis in four of the five cases studied. It 
is interesting that the highest correlations between events and votes were for the 2008 
Republicans and the 2016 Democrats (.864* and .819, respectively). Both elections also had the 
lowest number of candidates: six Republicans in 2008 and five Democrats in 2016. Overall, the 
correlation between the number of events and the number of votes was insignificant.  There 
seems to be a tradeoff between the quantity of events and the quality, or effectiveness, of events. 
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In some primaries, particularly those with a small number of candidates, the number of events 
may make a difference on voting results. Therefore, we ought not dismiss the effectiveness of 
campaign events entirely. In some elections, the number of events did correlate with high vote 
totals. It may very well be the number of candidates that determines the effectiveness of events.  
Sides and Vavreck, in their book The Gamble, argue that during the presidential general 
election in 2012, campaigning efforts by Obama and Romney effectively canceled each other 
out, because they were so evenly matched (Sides and Vavreck 2014). When candidates spend 
similar amounts of campaign funds, they may cancel any impact that campaign activity has on 
voters. This effect also takes place for Super PAC spending. When outside advocacy groups 
spend similar amounts of campaign funds, the impact of persuasive effects is canceled 
(Christenson, and Smidt 2014). One explanation for the minimal effects of campaign personal 
appearances could be the number of candidates vying for the presidency.  
An additional explanation for the minimal effects of campaigning could be technology 
advancement. Griffin, writing on how technology advancements have impacted advertising, 
argues there has been a shift from a “top-down,” to a “bottom-up” approach to marketing. That 
is, when advertising technology was scarce, the public had to rely on an “expert” who could 
determine the significance of an event. An example of this is a movie critic calling a movie “the 
feel good hit of the summer” (Griffin 2010, p.18-19). As voters become less dependent on 
experts to provide information, the value of a centralized entity seeking to influence an audience 
is diluted. Griffin argues that the priming effect is reduced in advertising. The same may be said 
for politics. 
Politics is not immune to this technological shift. In 1952, Senator Kefauver, before 
clinching the New Hampshire primary, became known to the public through the television 
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broadcasts of organized crime hearings (Scala 2003). In 2016, Sanders rose to notoriety in part 
due to his campaign’s presence in Facebook (Corasaniti 2015). As technology continues to 
advance, the value of meeting a presidential candidate may deteriorate. Whether the minimal 
effects of campaigning can be attributed to the number of candidates vying for office, or 
technological shifts, there remains no relationship between the number of events a candidate 
holds and the share of the New Hampshire vote the candidate receives for most of the elections 
examined in this study.  
Campaigning heavily in New Hampshire will not necessarily yield an increase in the 
number of newspaper name mentions for a candidate. The third hypothesis asserted that the more 
time a candidate spends in New Hampshire, the more newspaper name mentions they will 
receive. The results mirror that of the second hypothesis. In two elections, there was a 
statistically significant correlation between the number of personal appearances by a candidate 
and newspaper mentions for a candidate; the 2008 Republican and the 2016 Democratic 
campaigns. Therefore, while the number of events may not be a consistent predictor of 
newspaper name mentions, we cannot dismiss the effect entirely.  
Events may have an impact on newspaper name mentions, especially when there are few 
candidates running for president. The few elections included in this analysis makes it difficult to 
make a general conclusion about this point.  
The number of mentions a candidate receives from local New Hampshire newspapers is a 
better predictor of voting results than the number of personal appearances a candidate makes in 
New Hampshire. And, because we know that there is not a statistically significant correlation 
between the number of events a candidate holds and the number of news mentions they receive, 
a candidate cannot expect to accrue more news stories by simply holding more personal 
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appearances in New Hampshire. New Hampshire newspaper stories, therefore, contain coverage 
of events beyond what is going on during the New Hampshire primary season.  
Media name mentions favor candidates who win the primary. For example, Clinton and 
Obama in 2008 accounted for just over 20% of the total events held by Democrats that year, but 
they received nearly half of the total news mentions. Similarly, in 2016, Trump held only 43 
events for Republicans in 2016, but received the most news mentions that year. It is certainly 
true that it is easier for newspapers to report on polling data, and other “horse-race” metrics 
(Patterson 1980). It is also easy for the public to follow these metrics. In the end, campaign 
activity in New Hampshire is not the only priority for local newspapers, and therefore, it is 
difficult for candidates to obtain news coverage by their ground-game alone.  
The fourth hypothesis stated that the number and type of personal appearances for 
Democratic candidates will be different than the number and type of personal appearances for 
Republican candidates. The chi-square statistics were found to be significant for both the 2008 
and 2016 primaries. Because of these numbers, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that 
there is a relationship between the number and type of campaign events a candidate holds, and 
the party a candidate belongs to. For both the 2008 and 2016 New Hampshire primaries, the 
percent total of activist events by Republicans was lower than the percent total of activist events 
for each election cycle. The opposite was true for Democrats; the percent total of activist events 
by Democrats was higher than the percent total of activist events for each election cycle. There 
are several explanations for this trend.  
 Voter events include some of the traditional primary events such as town hall meetings. 
Perhaps because McCain pioneered the town hall in 2000 (Vavreck et al. 2002), Republicans 
favor town hall meetings over activist events. However, the data in this study does not support 
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this. Democrats held more in town hall meetings than Republicans in 2008; 143 town halls for 
Democrats compared with 128 town halls for Republicans. In fact, Democrats in 2008 exceeded 
the number of town halls held by Republican candidates in 2012, when the Republicans held 
only 139 town halls. Certainly, the Republicans favored town halls in 2016, holding 406, the 
most of any type of event in any cycle, but it is not the case that Republicans have traditionally 
held more town halls than Democrats (Appendix C). Despite the narrative of McCain’s come-
from-behind victory in 2000, where he used town halls as a cheap way to stump for votes, 
Republicans have not always favored this type of event more than Democrats.  
Turning to the activist events, Democrats regularly hold more of this type of event, than 
Republicans. The literature on party differences states that, traditionally, Democrats have been 
more indecisive in their nominations (Wattenberg 2009). However, in recent cycles, this trend 
has reversed itself. The Republicans have certainly been more indecisive in recent cycles (Sides 
and Vavreck 2014). With this in mind, the findings from this research are contrary to the 
contemporary status of Republican and Democratic parties.   
A possible explanation for this is that the New Hampshire primary foreshadows future 
trends in American politics. Yes, it is true that Democratic elections have been decisive during 
the past few election cycles, but as of this date, the debate within the Democratic establishment 
concerns who is next in line for leadership roles (Easley 2017). Future research should include a 
qualitative examination of party activists in New Hampshire to understand when they decide to 
back a candidate in the New Hampshire primary. It is likely that activists decide who they are 
going to vote for long before regular voters decide. This implies that candidates who hold activist 
events more often are wasting their time and resources. As we saw with our fifth hypothesis, 
candidates who have less money tend to favor these events.  
  66
The fifth hypothesis argues that the number and type of personal appearances for first-tier 
fundraising candidates will be different than the number and type of personal appearances for 
second-tier fundraising candidates. In two of the five elections in this study (2008 and 2016 
Republican primaries), there is a significant relationship between the number and type of events 
held by candidates and the campaign finance tier they belong to.  
The percentage of activist events for first-tier fundraising candidates was less than the 
percent total of activist events for the 2008 and 2016 Republican primaries. The percent total of 
activist events for second-tier fundraising candidates exceeded the percent total of activist events 
for both elections. The opposite was true for voter events; the percent of voter events for first-tier 
fundraising candidates exceeded the percent total of voter events for each cycle, and the percent 
total of voter events for second-tier fundraising candidates was less than the percent total of voter 
events for each cycle. First-tier fundraising candidates favored events such as town halls or meet 
and greets, while second-tier fundraising candidates favored events with activists and political 
party officials.  
One possible explanation for this difference in campaign styles is a matter of resources. It 
takes staffing, time, money, and additional resources to put on a campaign personal appearance 
such as a town hall meeting. A second-tier fundraising candidate does not have as much money 
to work with, by definition. Therefore, candidates who have the resources to put on campaign 
events directly for voters will be more inclined to do so. There is the logistical question of 
getting an audience to come to a candidate’s events.  
Campaigns face pressure to not only put on campaign events, but also to put on well-
attended campaign events. The media serves as a priming mechanism and an agenda-setting 
mechanism for voters (Golan and Wants 2001). Therefore, if media outlets report that a town 
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hall meeting was not well-attended, campaign events can work against campaigns, due to the 
negative press emerging from the poorly-managed event. The advantage of an activist event, 
such as a local party meeting, is that there is a captive audience. These party-centered events 
draw their crowds from local activists, so campaigns do not have to spend resources getting a 
crowd together for their events. In a way, activist events outsource much of the campaigning 
efforts to party officials. But again, there is no guarantee that the audience attending an activist 
event is undecided. Future research ought to dig deeper into the activity of modern party 
grassroots party organizations. In the end, a candidate’s financing will sometimes determine the 
number and type of campaign events they put on during the New Hampshire primary season, but 
this finding was not significant across every election cycle in this study.  
Finally, the multivariate analysis provides for an overall examination of the New 
Hampshire primary. The analysis looks at various campaign metrics that impact the vote totals 
on Primary Day. We find that, overall, the effectiveness of campaign personal appearances on 
primary votes is minimal at best, very much in line with the minimal effects theory of 
campaigns. Moreover, the only campaign metric that is statistically significantly correlated with 
voting results is newspaper name mentions; a microcosm for media effects. The story of the New 
Hampshire primary narrative paints a romantic picture of representative politicians, but as we 
can see, the real story is quite different. 
The true story of the New Hampshire primary involves much more than retail politics. 
The nationalization of the presidential nomination campaign allows for the media to have an 
influence over the process. This paper provides evidence that media effects have a greater 
influence with voters than the personal appearances of presidential candidates. This finding 
ought not be taken as a refutation of New Hampshire’s first in the nation primary status. The 
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advantages for New Hampshire being first do not necessarily hinge on the effectiveness of 
campaign personal appearances. Furthermore, the problems associated with New Hampshire’s 
placement would not be solved by allowing another state become the first in the nation primary.  
Critics of New Hampshire’s first in the nation primary status assert that the state is not 
demographically representative of the rest of the county (Smith and Moore 2015). Furthermore, 
critics of the modern nomination calendar argue that the increased pressure to gain campaign 
resources early on in the cycle discourages lesser known candidates to run for office (Mayer and 
Busch 2004). Proposed solutions to these issues, such as having more demographically 
representative states to move their primary and caucus up the nomination calendar, or to have a 
regional or national primary, do not necessarily address the issues raised. Furthermore, the issues 
raised do not hinge on effective retail politics. That is not to say there are no advantages to 
having candidates stump for votes in New Hampshire. The data show that New Hampshire sees 
an enormous amount of campaign activity from all major presidential candidates.  
When candidates pitch Granite State voters, they are testing out their campaign 
messaging. While it is certainly not the case that every voter becomes involved in the primary 
process, many do, and they legitimately attend political events such as town hall meetings and 
ask policy questions they are justifiably concerned about. Anecdotally, Senator Rubio of Florida 
often spoke on how the voters of the New Hampshire primary ask valid and important questions 
of their politicians at events such as town halls (The Circus 2016).  
Senator Rubio recently answered questions at a town hall meeting in Parkland, Florida, 
following a mass shooting at a Florida high school. One might wonder if the time the Senator 
spent in New Hampshire during the primary season helped him to engage with crowds that may 
not be on his side for policy issues (Associated Press 2018). Candidates who have to face voters 
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one-on-one do gain the opportunity to hone their messaging, so that they may be better prepared 
for the national stage, should they receive the nomination.  
Future research ought to focus in on the degree to which campaigning in New Hampshire 
may shift public opinion, or public focus, on certain issues. The current opiate crisis, which has 
hit New Hampshire particularly hard in recent years, was a highlighted issue during the 2016 
election cycle. Most recently, President Trump visited New Hampshire to speak on the subject. 
One might wonder if the issue would have received the same degree of focus by elected officials, 
should the first in the nation primary have been held in a state not impacted by the crisis.   
 This work provides an in-depth analysis of a topic that is quite salient in American 
electoral politics, but still has some secrets to it. The conventional wisdom of the New 
Hampshire primary is not upheld in this work, but the trends of the contemporary political 
culture are. There is power in the media, and in partisan forces. There is additionally some power 
in campaign financial differences among candidates, but the degree of severity on this issue is 
quite muted. In the end, it appears that the New Hampshire primary is simply a microcosm of a 
political system that does favor national forces over local influence. 
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Conclusion 
 The New Hampshire primary is a valuable part of the American presidential nomination 
system. This work finds that the time spent in New Hampshire does not necessarily lead to 
greater voting results, as is suggested by the New Hampshire narrative. Despite the findings of 
this work, New Hampshire’s place in the nomination cycle ought not change. Just because 
increased votes are not a direct result of New Hampshire retail politics does not mean giving up 
on the first in the nation status. There are several advantages for candidates if they chose to 
engage in retail politics in New Hampshire. Candidates receive preparation for interacting with 
voters on the national level.  Certainly, the New Hampshire primary is also a good institution for 
the state.  
New Hampshire receives a unique amount of presidential candidate attention every four 
years, and in particular, the two years preceding the New Hampshire presidential primary. The 
aggregate campaign activity of these would-be presidents tells us a bit about national trends in 
American politics, such as the degree of party unity and the impact of campaign finance. And in 
many ways, the aggregate campaign activity is a reflection of American society as a whole. The 
minimal effects of campaign personal appearances are certainly not unique to New Hampshire 
alone. Campaigning has consistently fell behind a dominant media influence on voters; they 
would rather follow the crowd. Despite this, every four years, candidates from across the country 
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Table A-1: 2008 New Hampshire Republican Primary Activity Breakdown 
Candidate Votes % Votes Visits % Visits Days % Days Events % Events 
McCain 88,571 38% 24 17% 59 23% 154 24% 
Romney 75,546 32% 37 27% 53 21% 153 24% 
Huckabee 26,859 11% 20 14% 48 19% 120 19% 
Giuliani 20,439 9% 28 20% 43 17% 115 18% 
Paul 18,308 8% 13 9% 23 9% 58 9% 
Thompson 2,894 1% 6 4% 8 3% 10 2% 
Hunter 1,225 1% 10 7% 21 8% 32 5% 
Totals 233,842 100% 138 100% 255 100% 642 100% 
Source: The New York Times, 2008 and Appleman, 2008a 
 
 
Table A-2: 2008 New Hampshire Democratic Primary Activity Breakdown 
Candidate Votes % Votes Visits % Visits Days % Days Events % Events 
Clinton 112,404 39% 26 15% 37 12% 91 11% 
Obama 104,815 37% 27 15% 44 14% 108 13% 
Edwards 48,699 17% 34 19% 62 19% 167 21% 
Richardson 13,269 5% 27 15% 53 17% 171 21% 
Kucinich 3,891 1% 17 10% 47 15% 98 12% 
Biden 638 0% 24 14% 35 11% 75 9% 
Dodd 205 0% 21 12% 41 13% 109 11% 
Totals 283,921 100% 176 100% 319 100% 819 100% 
Source: The New York Times, 2008 and Appleman, 2008b 
 
 
Table A-3: 2012 New Hampshire Republican Primary Activity Breakdown 
Candidate Votes % Votes Visits % Visits Days % Days Events % Events 
Romney 97,532 40% 37 18% 61 14% 107 12% 
Paul 56,848 23% 19 9% 40 9% 83 9% 
Huntsman 41,945 17% 22 11% 80 19% 207 23% 
Gingrich 23,411 10% 19 9% 31 7% 70 8% 
Santorum 23,392 9% 31 15% 51 12% 130 14% 
Perry 1,766 1% 9 4% 14 3% 25 3% 
Roemer 945 0% 6 3% 10 2% 18 2% 
Bachmann 349 0% 7 3% 13 3% 17 2% 
Johnson 181 0% 20 10% 73 17% 162 18% 
Cain 160 0% 17 8% 23 5% 36 4% 
McCotter 0 0% 4 2% 8 2% 13 1% 
Pawlenty 0 0% 11 5% 18 4% 31 3% 
Totals 246,529 100% 202 100% 422 100% 899 100% 
Source: The New York Times, 2012 and Appleman, 2012 
 
  77
Table A-4: 2016 New Hampshire Republican Primary Activity Breakdown 
Candidate Votes % Votes Visits % Visits Days % Days Events % Events 
Trump 100,406 36% 26 8% 30 5% 43 3% 
Kasich 44,909 16% 29 9% 73 11% 169 12% 
Cruz 33,189 12% 17 5% 36 6% 80 6% 
Bush 31,310 11% 26 8% 57 9% 115 8% 
Rubio 30,032 11% 23 7% 40 6% 89 5% 
Christie 21,069 7% 37 11% 77 12% 177 12% 
Fiorina 11,706 4% 24 7% 63 10% 157 11% 
Carson 6509 2% 11 3% 17 3% 36 2% 
Paul 1,900 1% 22 7% 38 6% 96 7% 
Huckabee 215 0% 5 2% 5 1% 7 0% 
Santorum 155 0% 7 2% 11 2% 17 1% 
Gilmore 133 0% 19 6% 44 7% 99 7% 
Pataki 80 0% 26 8% 47 7% 106 7% 
Graham 70 0% 28 9% 66 10% 180 12% 
Jindal 64 0% 10 3% 13 2% 21 1% 
Perry 0 0% 9 3% 16 2% 41 3% 
Walker 0 0% 7 2% 13 2% 37 3% 
Totals 281,747 100% 326 100% 646 100% 1470 100% 




Table A-5: 2016 New Hampshire Democratic Primary Activity Breakdown 
Candidate Votes % Votes Visits % Visits Days % Days Events % Events 
Sanders 151,584 61% 33 28% 48 31% 78 30% 
Clinton 95,252 38% 24 20% 37 24% 70 27% 
O'Malley 643 0% 23 19% 32 21% 73 28% 
Webb 0 0% 3 3% 4 3% 7 3% 
Chafee 0 0% 35 30% 35 22% 32 12% 
Totals 247,479 100% 118 100% 156 100% 260 100% 
























% Total Total %Total 
McCain 513 29% 480 29% 993 27% 
Romney 415 23% 404 24% 819 23% 
Giuliani 289 16% 293 17% 582 16% 
Huckabee 176 10% 193 11% 369 10% 
Paul 185 10% 162 10% 347 10% 
Thompson 133 8% 108 6% 241 7% 
Hunter 59 3% 39 2% 98 3% 
Totals 1770 100% 1679 100% 3449 100% 
Source: The New York Times, 2008 and Union Leader, 2016 and Concord Monitor, 2016 
 
 







% Total Total %Total 
Clinton 563 26% 649 28% 1212 26% 
Obama 458 21% 567 24% 1025 22% 
Edwards 468 22% 414 18% 882 19% 
Richardson 237 11% 235 10% 472 10% 
Biden 147 7% 182 8% 329 7% 
Dodd 148 7% 163 7% 311 7% 
Kucinich 113 5% 130 6% 243 5% 
Totals 2134 100% 2340 100% 4474 100% 
Source: The New York Times, 2008 and Union Leader, 2016 and Concord Monitor, 2016 
 
 







% Total Total %Total 
Romney 404 20% 296 18% 700 18% 
Gingrich 242 12% 233 14% 475 12% 
Paul 231 11% 197 12% 428 11% 
Perry 191 9% 197 12% 388 10% 
Huntsman 190 9% 182 11% 372 9% 
Santorum 187 9% 157 9% 344 9% 
Bachmann 140 7% 125 7% 265 7% 
Cain 140 7% 106 6% 246 6% 
Pawlenty 120 6% 75 4% 195 5% 
Johnson 121 6% 62 4% 183 5% 
Roemer 44 2% 38 2% 82 2% 
McCotter 7 0% 7 0% 14 0% 
Totals 2017 100% 1675 100% 3692 100% 
Source: The New York Times, 2012 and Union Leader, 2016 and Concord Monitor, 2016 
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% Total Total %Total 
Trump 416 14% 366 16% 782 17% 
Christie 333 11% 236 11% 569 12% 
Bush 279 9% 226 10% 505 11% 
Cruz 216 7% 216 10% 432 9% 
Paul 228 8% 145 7% 373 8% 
Fiorina 198 7% 146 7% 344 7% 
Kasich 201 7% 140 6% 341 7% 
Rubio 140 5% 166 7% 306 6% 
Graham 158 5% 105 5% 263 6% 
Carson 132 4% 124 6% 256 5% 
Walker 163 5% 77 3% 240 5% 
Perry 130 4% 59 3% 189 4% 
Pataki 93 3% 53 2% 146 3% 
Jindal 88 3% 49 2% 137 3% 
Santorum 84 3% 39 2% 123 3% 
Huckabee 64 2% 51 2% 115 2% 
Gilmore 49 2% 26 1% 75 2% 
Totals 2972 100% 2224 100% 5196 100% 











% Total Total %Total 
Clinton 521 52% 481 49% 1002 54% 
Sanders 280 28% 344 35% 624 34% 
O'Malley 151 15% 135 14% 286 16% 
Webb 52 5% 24 2% 76 4% 
Chafee 6 1% 2 0% 8 0% 
Totals 1010 100% 986 100% 1996 100% 













Table C-1a: 2008 New Hampshire Republican Candidates and Events by Category 
Candidate Activist % Total Influence % Total Voter % Total Total Events 
McCain 39 24% 9 13% 106 24% 154 
Romney 25 15% 20 29% 108 24% 153 
Huckabee 51 31% 15 22% 54 12% 120 
Giuliani 21 13% 10 15% 84 19% 115 
Paul 11 7% 5 7% 42 10% 58 
Hunter 13 8% 6 9% 13 3% 32 
Thompson 3 2% 3 4% 4 1% 10 
Totals 163 100% 68 100% 411 100% 642 
Source: Appleman, 2008a 
 
Table C-1b: 2008 New Hampshire Republican Events by Category 
Category Event Type Count % Total 
Activist Campaign Activist Event 32 5% 
  Electioneering 15 2% 
  Official Party Event 49 8% 
  Private House Party 46 7% 
  Rally/GOTV Event 13 2% 
  Watch Party 8 1% 
  Category Total 163 25% 
Influence Facility Tour 29 5% 
  Meeting with E-Board 6 1% 
  VIP Meeting 22 3% 
  Roundtable 11 2% 
  Category Total 68 11% 
Voter Meet and Greet 225 35% 
  Parade 4 1% 
  Policy Speech 54 8% 
  Town Hall 128 20% 
  Category Total 411 64% 
Totals   642 100% 
Source: Appleman, 2008a 
 
Table C-2a: 2008 New Hampshire Democratic Candidates and Events by Category 
Candidate Activist % Total Influence % Total Voter % Total Total Events 
Richardson 64 20% 8 10% 99 23% 171 
Edwards 55 17% 6 8% 106 24% 167 
Dodd 59 18% 8 10% 42 10% 109 
Obama 31 10% 19 24% 57 13% 107 
Kucinich 29 9% 4 5% 65 15% 98 
Clinton 42 13% 9 11% 40 9% 91 
Biden 39 12% 7 9% 30 7% 76 
Totals 319 100% 61  100% 439 100% 819 
Source: Appleman, 2008b  
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Table C-2b: 2008 New Hampshire Democratic Events by Category 
Category Event Type Count % Total 
Activist Campaign Activist Event 70 9% 
  Electioneering 32 4% 
  Official Party Event 32 4% 
  Private House Party 117 14% 
  Rally/GOTV Event 57 7% 
  Watch Party 11 1% 
  Category Total 319 39% 
Influence Facility Tour 6 1% 
  Meeting with E-Board 11 1% 
  VIP Meeting 19 2% 
  Roundtable 25 3% 
  Category Total 61 7% 
Voter Meet and Greet 211 26% 
  Parade 9 1% 
  Policy Speech 76 9% 
  Town Hall 143 17% 
  Category Total 439 54% 
Total   819                     100% 
Source: Appleman, 2008b 
 
 
Table C-3a: 2012 New Hampshire Republican Candidates and Events by Category 
Candidate Activist % Total Influence % Total Voter % Total Total Events 
Huntsman 48 20% 28 29% 131 25% 207 
Johnson 41 17% 23 24% 98 19% 162 
Santorum 46 19% 9 9% 75 14% 130 
Romney 24 10% 13 14% 70 13% 107 
Paul 19 8% 7 7% 57 11% 83 
Gingrich 14 6% 8 8% 48 9% 70 
Cain 16 7% 3 3% 17 3% 36 
Pawlenty 17 7% 2 2% 12 2% 31 
Perry 6 2% 2 2% 17 3% 25 
Roemer 10 4% 1 1% 7 1% 18 
Bachmann 8 3% 1 1% 8 2% 17 
McCotter 12 5% 0 0% 1 0% 13 
Totals 261 100% 97 100% 541 100% 899 








Table C-3b: 2012 New Hampshire Republican Events by Category 
Category Event Type Count % Total 
Activist Campaign Activist Event 93 10% 
  Electioneering 21 2% 
  Official Party Event 64 7% 
  Private House Party 59 7% 
  Rally/GOTV Event 15 2% 
  Watch Party 9 1% 
  Category Total 261 29% 
Influence Facility Tour 35 4% 
  Meeting with E-Board 21 2% 
  VIP Meeting 21 2% 
  Roundtable 20 2% 
  Category Total 97 11% 
Voter Meet and Greet 293 33% 
  Parade 6 1% 
  Policy Speech 103 11% 
  Town Hall 139 15% 
  Category Total 541 60% 
Total   899                     100% 
Source: Appleman, 2012 
 
Table C-4a: 2016 New Hampshire Republican Candidates and Events by Category 
Candidate Activist % Total Influence % Total Voter % Total Total Events 
Graham 37 10% 37 21% 106 12% 180 
Christie 37 10% 18 10% 122 13% 177 
Kasich 25 7% 14 8% 130 14% 169 
Fiorina 49 13% 15 8% 93 10% 157 
Bush 10 3% 18 10% 87 10% 115 
Pataki 30 8% 17 9% 59 6% 106 
Gilmore 42 11% 20 11% 37 4% 99 
Paul 21 5% 8 4% 67 7% 96 
Rubio 21 5% 4 2% 64 7% 89 
Cruz 27 7% 3 2% 50 6% 80 
Trump 24 6% 5 3% 14 2% 43 
Perry 18 5% 10 6% 13 1% 41 
Walker 8 2% 6 3% 23 3% 37 
Carson 10 3% 1 1% 25 3% 36 
Jindal 13 3% 2 1% 6 1% 21 
Santorum 5 1% 0 0% 12 1% 17 
Huckabee 5 1% 1 1% 1 0% 7 
Totals 382  100% 179  100% 909  100% 1470 






Table C-4b: 2016 New Hampshire Republican Events by Category 
Category Event Type Count % Total 
Activist Campaign Activist Event 73 5% 
  Electioneering 30 2% 
  Official Party Event 158 11% 
  Private House Party 74 5% 
  Rally/GOTV Event 37 3% 
  Watch Party 12 1% 
  Category Total 384 26% 
Influence Facility Tour 69 5% 
  Meeting with E-Board 1 0% 
  VIP Meeting 40 3% 
  Roundtable 69 5% 
  Category Total 179 12% 
Voter Meet and Greet 343 23% 
  Parade 9 1% 
  Policy Speech 149 10% 
  Town Hall 406 28% 
  Category Total 907 62% 
Total   1470 100% 
Source: Appleman, 2016a 
 
Table C-5a: 2016 New Hampshire Democratic Candidates and Events by Category 
Candidate Activist % Total Influence % Total Voter % Total Total Events 
Sanders 33 29% 1 5% 44 35% 78 
O'Malley 26 23% 11 58% 36 29% 73 
Clinton 35 30% 6 32% 29 23% 70 
Chafee 20 17% 0 0% 12 10% 32 
Webb 2 2% 1 5% 4 3% 7 
Totals 116  100% 19  100% 125  100% 260 
















Table C-5b: 2016 New Hampshire Democratic Events by Category 
Category Event Type Count % Total 
Activist Campaign Activist Event 26 11% 
  Electioneering 5 2% 
  Official Party Event 39 17% 
  Private House Party 18 8% 
  Rally/GOTV Event 26 11% 
  Watch Party 2 1% 
  Category Total 116 49% 
Influence Facility Tour 4 2% 
  Meeting with E-Board 0 0% 
  VIP Meeting 3 1% 
  Roundtable 12 5% 
  Category Total 19 8% 
Voter Meet and Greet 23 10% 
  Parade 5 2% 
  Policy Speech 31 13% 
  Town Hall 66 28% 
  Category Total 125 53% 
Total   260 110% 





























Table D-1: 2008 Republican Primary Total Fundraising and Outside Spending*  
Candidate Total Finance % Total 
Romney $105,101,263.00  36% 
Giuliani $64,455,052.00  22% 
McCain $53,714,586.00  18% 
Paul $32,583,853.00  11% 
Thompson $23,644,412.00  8% 
Huckabee $13,948,520.00  5% 
Hunter $2,552,102.00  1% 
Total $295,999,788.00  100% 
1st Tier Average $55,899,833.20    
2nd Tier Average $8,250,311.00    
*As of January 31, 2008 





Table D-2: 2008 Democratic Primary Total Fundraising and Outside Spending 
Candidate Total Finance % Total 
Obama $150,283,903.00  38% 
Clinton $134,535,489.00  34% 
Edwards $50,800,856.00  13% 
Richardson $22,660,405.00  6% 
Dodd $16,561,696.00  4% 
Biden $11,509,971.00  3% 
Kucinich $4,414,083.00  1% 
Total $390,766,403.00  100% 
1st Tier Average $89,570,163.25    
2nd Tier Average $10,828,583.33    
*As of January 31, 2008 
















Table D-3: 2012 Republican Primary Total Fundraising and Outside Spending* 
Candidate Total Finance % Total 
Romney $73,314,397.00  28% 
Gingrich $50,142,387.00  19% 
Santorum $35,689,808.00  14% 
Paul $34,868,051.00  13% 
Perry $24,007,596.00  9% 
Cain $16,779,032.00  6% 
Bachmann $10,270,505.00  4% 
Huntsman $8,331,685.00  3% 
Pawlenty $5,118,996.00  2% 
Johnson $643,717.00  0% 
McCotter $547,389.00  0% 
Roemer $389,234.00  0% 
Total $260,102,797.00  100% 
1st Tier Average $43,604,447.80    
2nd Tier Average $6,011,508.29    
*As of January 31, 2012 
Source: Federal Election Commission, 2016 and Open Secrets, 2016 
 
 
Table D-4: 2016 Republican Primary Total Fundraising and Outside Spending* 
Candidate Total Finance % Total 
Bush $120,512,524.00  22% 
Rubio $82,734,708.00  15% 
Cruz $81,661,506.00  15% 
Trump $69,526,319.00  13% 
Carson $62,860,505.00  12% 
Christie $28,995,895.00  5% 
Kasich $28,648,890.00  5% 
Paul $17,158,052.00  3% 
Fiorina $15,848,450.00  3% 
Walker $11,076,155.00  2% 
Huckabee $7,114,116.00  1% 
Graham $5,629,463.00  1% 
Jindal $4,442,464.00  1% 
Perry $3,427,133.00  1% 
Santorum $1,388,612.00  0% 
Pataki $544,183.00  0% 
Total $541,568,975.00  100% 
1st Tier Average $67,848,621.00    
2nd Tier Average $7,403,180.89    
*As of January 31, 2016 





Table D-5: 2016 Democratic Primary Total Fundraising and Outside Spending* 
Candidate Total Finance % Total 
Clinton $142,443,637.00  58% 
Sanders $102,311,423.00  41% 
O'Malley $1,236,445.00  1% 
Webb $764,992.00  0% 
Total $246,756,497.00  100% 
1st Tier Average $122,377,530.00    
2nd Tier Average $1,000,718.50    
*As of January 31, 2016 








































Table E-1: Bi-Variate Correlation Coefficients for Number of Voters  
and Number of Events by County: 2008-2016,  
Excluding Dropout Candidates 
Year Party Correlation 
2008 Republicans .929** 
2008 Democrats .950** 
2012 Republicans .955** 
2016 Democrats .948** 
2016 Republicans .985** 
Overall (Combined) .808** 
Source: Author’s Calculations.  
Levels of Significance: *P< 0.05 level, **P<0.01 level, ***P<0.00 level 
 
 
Table E-2: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and  
Party, 2008 New Hampshire Primary Without Candidate Dropouts 
Type of Event Republicans Democrats Total 
Activist 25% (163) 36% (226) 30% (389) 
Influence 11% (68) 7% (44) 9% (112) 
Voter 64% (410) 57% (365) 61% (775) 
        
Total 100% (641) 100% (635) 100% (1276) 
X2=17.931 P<.000     
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
Table E-3: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and  
Party, 2016 New Hampshire Primary Without Candidate Dropouts 
Type of Event Republicans Democrats Total 
Activist 26% (255) 47% (70) 29% (325) 
Influence 10% (99) 4% 7 9% (106) 
Voter 64% (635) 49% (73) 62% (708) 
        
Total 100% (989) 100% (150) 100% (1139) 
X2= 28.962 P<.000     











Table E-4: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and Finance  
Tier, 2008 New Hampshire Republican Primary Without Candidate Dropouts 
Type of Event First-Tier Second-Tier Total 
Activist 20% (96) 41% (67) 25% (163) 
Influence 9% (44) 15% (24) 11% (68) 
Voter 71% (339) 44% (71) 64% (410) 
        
Total 100% (479) 100% (162) 100% (641) 
X2= 38.989 P<.000     
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
Table E-5: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and Finance  
Tier, 2008 New Hampshire Democratic Primary Without Candidate Dropouts 
Type of Event First-Tier Second-Tier Total 
Activist 37% (197) 30% (29) 36% (226) 
Influence 7% (40) 4% (4) 7% (44) 
Voter 56% (300) 66% (65) 57% (365) 
        
Total 100% (537) 100% (98) 100% (635) 
X2= 4.105 P>.000     
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
Table E-6: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and Finance  
Tier, 2012 New Hampshire Democratic Primary Without Candidate Dropouts 
Type of Event First-Tier Second-Tier Total 
Activist 23% (49) 28% (118) 26% (167) 
Influence 10% (22) 11% (46) 11% (68) 
Voter 67% (144) 61% (261) 63% (405) 
        
Total 100% (215) 100% (425) 100% (640) 
X2= 2.099 P>.000     
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
Table E-7: Chi-Square Analysis of Type of Event by Candidate and Finance  
Tier, 2016 New Hampshire Democratic Primary Without Candidate Dropouts 
Type of Event First-Tier Second-Tier Total 
Activist 25% (92) 26% (163) 26% (255) 
Influence 9% (31) 11% (68) 10% (99) 
Voter 66% (239) 63% (395) 64% (634) 
        
Total 100% (362) 100% (626) 100% (988) 
X2= 1.550 P>.000     
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
